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Abstract 
Resulting from CSO critique of the Paris Declaration signatories of the Accra Agenda
committed themselves to deepen CSO engagement in national aid effectiveness. Therefore
the purpose herein is to increase understanding over functions, mechanisms, hindrances and
opportunities facing CSO in this process in Tanzania.
The primary method for achieving this was semi-structured interviews with 21 persons from
the Government of Tanzania, Development Partners and CSOs.
It was concluded that there are a multitude of functions for CSOs in aid effectiveness.
Whereas Development Partners stressed the importance of advocacy Government
highlighted service delivery as main function of CSOs. Regarding mechanisms, it was
concluded that there already exist structures allowing CSOs participation. However, the
qualityof them are perceived to be lowand theyare more on an ad hoc basis rather than part
of an ongoing participatory system. The non-conducive socio-political environment and low
capacity of CSOs were identified as main hindrances whereas the increased transparency of
Government was considered the main opportunity. Lastly the importance of letting CSOs
determining themselves which role(s) they should play and how was stressed in order to
avoid some kind of Accra conditionality of participation' driven by Development Partners
and Government.
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1 Introduction 
It is normatively argued that Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are important stakeholders in
national development processes (Mcllwaine 1998). Apart from ensuring “…effective delivery of
development programs and operations...” CSOs are considered as important actors in advocating
and promoting participation and empowerment of citizens (AGCSAE 2007:1). Nevertheless, so
far, the recognition and incorporation of CSOs in the international agenda on aid effectiveness
has been limited (ibid).
The demand for greater aid effectiveness has grown stronger over the last years due to
unprecedented transaction costs. Today over 60 000 aid projects are founded by different donors
worldwide. For some recipient countries this means managing around 800 newprojects per year,
hosting 1,000 donor missions and writing 2,400 reports quarterly. Besides it is increasinglyargued
that the effects of development assistance, in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction,
are insufficient. (Millennium Campaign News)
In light of this a number of international agendas have been developed and signed by both
Development Partners (DPs) and recipient countries. In the forefront of these consensus are the
Monterrey Statement (2002), Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003), Joint Marrakech
Memorandum (2004), Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and Accra Agenda for
Action (2006).1 Even if the ratification of these agendas is considered major steps in reforming
and improving international aid flow systems, they have been subject to critique and scepticism.
Particularly the Paris Declaration, dealing specifically with aid effectiveness, has been criticised by
civil society representatives (Rajani 2008). CSOs, national as international, have argued that, due
to its technical focus, the Declaration misses out on the core point; that “[t]he purpose of aid
effectiveness is not aid effectiveness, but households escaping impoverishment, and people
realizing concrete changes in their life” (ibid:1). It has further been advocated that the Paris
Declaration only addresses the donor-government relationship and hence fails to recognise
CSOs, not only as policy stakeholders, but as development actors in their own right (Tomlinson
2008). Consequently it has been asserted that CSOs might run the risk of becoming marginalised
both in terms of funding and policy influence within the aid effectiveness framework (INTRAC
2007).
To this end the role of CSOs in aid effectiveness was one of the main topics discussed at the
High Level Forum in Accra 20082. It was concluded in the Accra Agenda for Action that
necessaryactions are to:
  Deepen the engagement with CSOs as valued partners whose contributions to development
complement those of government and of the private sector, and inviting them to explore
ways to maximise their value added.
  Invite CSOs to consider how the Paris principles can best be applied to CSOs as well as
enriched from a CSO perspective.
1 See Appendix 1
2 The conference in Accra was the Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and took place 2-4
September 2008. Over 1200 representatives from governments of aid receiving countries,
parliaments, development partners, CSOs and foundations gathered in order to discuss how to
improve the qualityand impact of aid (EU 2008)
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  Work with CSOs to better understand the enabling conditions and funding models that
condition CSO performance and make necessaryadjustment to ensure that CSOs are able to
reach their full potential in different settings (Accra Agenda for Action 2008:3-4)
Nevertheless, several questions remain at national level in terms of procedures and structures for
CSOs involvement. Accordingly:
As diverse, democratic, development actors in their own right, an important challenge for
CSOs in the post Accra period will be how to conceive institutional mechanisms for CSOs
to take their 'seat at the table (RealityCheck2008:26).
1.1 Purpose and Research Questions 
Evidently, there is a need and call for analytical discussions over how CSOs can become more
integrated into national aid effectiveness processes. The objective of this paper is consequently
to, within the Tanzanian context, identify and analyse perceptions of Government stakeholders,
DPs and CSO representatives regarding CSOs and national aid effectiveness. The purpose of this
is to increase the understanding regarding functions of and mechanisms for CSO involvement as
well as over hindrances and opportunities facing CSOs engagement in aid effectiveness. To fulfil
this purpose following research questions will be addressed in relation to aid effectiveness in
Tanzania:
 Which are the perceptions of government stakeholders, development partners and CSOs
representatives concerning the roles of CSOs?
 Which are the perceptions of government stakeholders, development partners and CSOs
representatives regarding ways and mechanisms for CSOs to activelytake part?
 What hindrances and opportunities are government stakeholders, development partners
and CSOs representatives perceive there to be for CSOs in becoming valued partners?
It is anticipated that the documentation and analysis of stakeholder perceptions will contribute
with an informative benchmark necessary for national discussions as urged by the Accra Agenda
for Action. The reason for choosing Tanzania as case study is due to the fact that Tanzania is
regarded to be in the forefront in fulfilling the Paris principles3 on aid effectiveness (OECD
2007). Moreover, in the direct aftermath of the Accra High Level Forum the attending Tanzanian
representatives from both the donor and Government side acknowledged the need for initial
studies on how to integrate CSOs accordingly (Personal communication with DPG Secretariat
personnel). Hence, Tanzania constitutes an interesting country to study in regard to the Accra
guidelines on CSO engagement in aid effectiveness.
1.2 Outline  
The thesis consists of seven chapters. The forthcoming chapter outlines the methodological
approach of and practical methods applied in the study. In the third chapter the concepts of
CSOs and aid effectiveness will be abstractly discussed so to provide the reader with a theoretical
understanding of the topic and to create a benchmark for analysis. The fourth chapter outlines
the characteristics of the Tanzanian civil society and the history of aid effectiveness in the
country. The fifth chapter constitutes the core of the paper as it presents the results from the
interviews along with analyses of the research questions. Before summarising the Thesis there will
be a discussion commenting the investigation process. Lastlya concluding section will summarise
the studyand highlight main findings and contributions.
3 See Theoretical Framework
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2 Method 
In this section the methodological approach guiding the investigation and the practical methods
chosen for retrieving data will be outlined. Further the ethical considerations taken and expected
limitations of the studywill be discussed.
2.1 Methodological Approach 
Due to the exploratory and knowledge enhancing character of the investigation the
methodological approach will be guided by the Grounded Theory Approach as adopted by
Glaser and Strauss (1967). According to grounded theorytheoretical sampling "...is the process of
data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst jointly collects, codes and analyses his
data and decides what data to collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory
as it emerges" (1967:45). Hence, by allowing data collection becoming a dynamic and ongoing
process, interlinked with analysis, the study contains both inductive and deductive features
(Bryman 2004). Simultaneously as collecting data the researcher 'codes' it. Coding is the practise
when the researcher breaks down and organise the empirical findings in categories (Charmaz
1983). Coding is however more than simply managing the data as it allows for conceptualization
and categorization of the phenomenon of interest (Bryman 2004). Identified concepts and/or
categories4 can then be used as "...building blocks of theory" (Strauss & Corbin 1998:101)
When applying this methodology data collection continues until 'theoretical saturation' is reached
(Bryman 2004). 'Theoretical saturation' signifies the stage when "(a) no newor relevant data seem
to be emerging regarding a category, (b) the category is well developed in terms of its properties
and dimensions demonstrating variation, and (c) the relationship among categories are well
established and validated" (Strauss & Corbin 1998: 212). Consequently, when applying grounded
theory the researcher sample "...in terms of what is relevant to and meaningful" in regard to the
purpose (ibid:306). Therefore, there is no requirement of statistical representativeness or random
selection. Having reached theoretical saturation the researcher starts to structure and analyse the
result to see if any 'hypothesis' or generalisable conclusions can be derived (Bryman 2004). With
grounded theory the objective is not predominately to deductively test or verify a theory but
rather to expand the frame of understanding of the studied phenomenon and if possible add to
theory(Svenning 2003).
As stated the purpose of this study is to increase the understanding of CSOs in aid effectiveness
and not to test or develop a theory per se. This is due to the limited theoretical benchmark
regarding CSO engagement in domestic aid effectiveness processes within the framework of the
Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. Nevertheless, it must be recognised that
there is a multitude of theory dealing with civil society and development at large. Likewise CSO
engagement in national poverty reduction strategies is well investigated. Therefore, whereas this
study finds it theoretical basis in the overarching theories of civil society in development, it aims
at increasing the context specific understanding of CSO engagement in aid effectiveness
processes by identify trends, discrepancies, relations etc. In this aspect it is perceived that
grounded theory, if leaning towards its inductive side, not onlyconstitutes a good methodological
framework, but also a useful method for handling empirical data. In forthcoming section the
process of how I applied grounded theory will be summarised in line with the practical methods
used.
4 Whereas ‘concept’ explains a simple phenomenon a category is either an elaborated concept or a
conjunction of several concepts. By this, categories are at a higher level of abstraction than a concept (Bryman
2004:403).
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2.2 Methods of Research  
The empirical data was gathered from both primary and secondary sources. Secondary
information, retrieved through desk reviews of documents, was used in constructing the
conceptual/theoretical framework and the contextual background of the study. The study was
based on an internship5 at the Development Partners Group (DPG) Secretariat6. Through
participatory observations within DPG and 187 semi-structured interviews with representatives
from the three stakeholder groups first-hand data was retrieved.
Literature Review 
As a first step in the Grounded Theory Approach I engaged in literature review of relevant
documentation. This was done to get familiarized with the topic and to construct the
conceptual/theoretical framework and contextual background of the Thesis. Before using any of
the documents they were analysed in accordance to the criteria of authenticity, creditability and
representativeness to determine their qualityand relevance for the study.
Participant Observations  
An important part of the study was the on-going participatory observations done within the
Tanzanian aid-system. Working at the aid coordinative unit of the DPG Secretariat and by
regularly participate in DPG meetings, seminars and workshops8 allowed me to gain a deeper
understanding of aid effectiveness in Tanzania by daily being exposed to its practical,
administrative and technical aspects. This also enabled me to establish initial contact with
presumable informants. As part of the Grounded Theory Approach any observations done
during these meetings were noted down in a field-journal.
Semi-Structured Interviews  
The main method for data collection was semi-structured interviews with Government
stakeholders, DPs and CSO representatives. As I explained elsewhere "[a] semi-structure means
that rather than having a pre-determined set of questions, the interviews are guided by a subject
structure containing indirect thematic topics" (Tanghøj 2007:23). The advantage is that space is
given the interviewer to adjust the interview as it proceeds. It also allows informants to speak
more freely, using their own frames of reference, when discussing (May 1997). Engrafting
informants with a feeling of 'liberty' is of specific importance within this kind of study where
peoples' perceptions are of primaryinterest.
The guiding interview-structure9 applied herein was based around four ‘thematic boxes’. Each of
the four boxes were given a heading and bullet points summarising the main issues I wanted to
discuss in relation to the research questions10. This allowed me to 'jump' between the thematic
boxes in accordance to what the informant brought up for discussion and how the interview
evolved. Hence, the topics tied to the boxes could be discussed interchangeable. The ambition
was to, when completed the interview, have touched upon all four themes. Therefore, it was my
5 The internship was carried out in Dar es Salaam from 25 of August 2008 to 3 of March 2009.
6 See Appendix 2 for Glossary
7 In total 21 persons were interviewed.
8 See Appendix 3 for an overviewof meetings and workshops
9 This guiding structure has been derived from a dialogue method designed by Hjern and Andersson
(1998) called the 'For Whom Group' method. The ‘For Whom Group’ method was shared with me
byBennyHjern (Professor in Political Science and FacultyHead at Jönköping International Business
School) as part of a field-studypreparing course in 2007.
10 See Appendix 4 for interviewstructure
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role as interviewer to, at the same time as impelling the informant to speak freely, make sure that
the essential issues were covered during the interview. However, there were no pre-determined
questions for achieving this. Rather the intention was to tentatively guide the informant through
the boxes by asking open questions in response to what they narrated, described, exemplified
etc.(Hjern and Andersson 1998).
As stated, apart from recording and transcribing all interviews I kept a field-journal in which I
documented, coded, categorised and commented on observations made. This made it possible to
determine if observed phenomena were ad hoc or reappearing and when 'theoretical saturation'
had been reached.
Selection Process of Informants 
As indicated there are three stakeholder groups that are represented in the study: CSOs,
Government and DPs. This wider set of stakeholder representation is expected to contribute to a
more dynamic analysis of the research questions. That I have chosen these three specific groups
is due to them being identified by the Accra Agenda for Action as the primary actors for aid
effectiveness.
Even if the paper at times refers to civil society, focus has solely been on CSOs as actors in
development. The reason for limiting the scope of research to this civil society 'sector' is that,
apart from their mission being explicitly and uniquely developmental in character, CSOs are
primary agents of civil society with which governments and DPs interact on a regular basis
(AGCSAE 2008:3). Even if my intention has not been to limiting the definition of CSOs it
should be acknowledged that it predominately were CSOs with a clear development agenda that
were consulted. No CBOs, research institutes, private sector associations etc. were included11.
However, two international NGOs were incorporated in order to broaden the CSO
representation. Regarding DPs, both technical and political personnel from multilateral as well as
bilateral donor-agencies have been interviewed in order to capture a broader dimension of DP
representation. From Government onlypersons form the aid coordinating unit at the Ministryof
Finance and Economic Affairs agreed to participate in the study. In Appendix 5 the
representation from the three stakeholder groups can be further studied.
In line with the Grounded Theory Approach informants were selected through a combination of
purposive and snow-ball sampling. Purposive sampling is when the "...researcher samples on the
basis of wanting to interview people who are relevant to the research question" (Bryman
2004:334). Whereas snow-ball sampling is an approach where the researcher make "...initial
contact with a small group of people who are relevant to the research topic and then uses these
to establish contacts with others" (ibid:100). In practice an initial group of informants from each
stakeholder group where identified in collaboration with the Aid Coordination Specialist at the
DPG Secretariat and with representatives from the UN Civil Society Advisory Committee
(UNCSAC)12. The Aid Coordination Specialist sent an email to this group presenting the research
and expressing her wish of their participation. Shortly thereafter I sent an email introducing
myself and the research more in detail. I appended a Concept Note of the intended studywith an
adherent Interview Synopsis13. A request for an interview was also placed. Of the 11 emails that
11 The reason for this is mainly due to time restraints and the limited scope of the study as well as due
to the adopted selection methods.
12 See Glossary in Appendix 2
13 The idea behind providing the informants with a Concept Note explaining the background and
purpose of the study more in detail along with an Interview Synopsis was to enable the informants
to get a better picture of the topic and to better prepare in front of the interview. These documents
can be retrieved bysending a request to: tanghojerike@ hotmail.com
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were sent 10 informants accepted to be interviewed. Nevertheless, I perceived that I had not
reached theoretical saturation after interviewing these 10 participants. Accordingly, further
informants were required. I came in contact with the additional informant either through
recommendation from already interviewed informants or during meetings, workshops, seminars
etc. Also these people received the same introductory email with attachments. In total 21 people
were consulted in 18 interviews14.
2.3 Ethical Considerations  
All studies based on collecting data from people evoke ethical concerns. These include “…taking
care to avoid harming people, having due regard for their privacy, respecting them as individuals
and not subjecting them to unnecessary research” (Goddard & Melville 2004:49). In general
terms this conveys e.g. that interviews should be voluntary and based upon informed consent,
that data is handled carefully and respectfully by the researcher and that informants are given the
opportunityto read through the written material before finalising and publishing it.
The major ethical consideration specific for this studyregards the relationship between CSOs and
the Government of Tanzania. As will become evident in forthcoming chapters there is a history
of an underlying tension between civil societyand Government. As the case studyof HakiElimu15
below attests; CSOs, up to date, might run the risk of being banned if being too critical of or
inconvenient to the Government. Even if the relationship is ameliorating (Lang et al 2000) some
CSO representatives have expressed concerns over their participation in the study. Hence, it is
myresponsibilityas a researcher to avoid adding to this tension bypublishing anything that might
position a CSO in a bad relation with the Government. Due to this I have taken following
measurements to prevent anyethical inconveniences.
First, the research set up, outlined in a Concept Note, was run through and accepted bythe DPG
Secretariat, DPG Main, JAST Working Group and UNCSAC16. The Concept Note was
distributed to the contemplated informants in order to give them the opportunity to take an
informed decision whether to participate or not in the study. The interviews per se were
voluntary and the informants choose what kind of recording devices that could be used. Lastly, I
shared three drafts of the Thesis with the DPG Secretariat in order to get comments upon the
material. Likewise, the final draft was sent to all informants for approval before publishing it.
To guarantee anonymity of informants no direct referencing is done in the Thesis. Instead
following code system has been used:
 Development Partners (DP1-10)
 CSO representatives (CSO1-7)

 Government officials (GoTa-b)17
It should be acknowledged that there is no connection between the assigned number and the
order of the interviews as presented in Appendix 6.
14 See Appendix 6 for list of interviews
15 See Box 4 for case study
16 See Glossary in Appendix 1
17 The letter ‘a’ and ‘b’ are used when two persons have participated in the interview.
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2.4 Limitations  
My responsibility and assignment as a researcher is to open-mindedly conduct research and in a
veracious way retell what I have been told. Yet, it must be kept in mind what Kant once said:
"The only thing we can observe are the perceptions of the world: how it appears to us" (Kant
cited in Moses & Knutsen 2007:172). Hence, regardless of methodological and ethical
considerations there are certain limitations with the study.
Apart from the possible subjectivity of the analysis, the scope of the investigation is too narrow
to capture an outright picture of the topic or to drawany clear-cut conclusions. The study rather
allows for pinpointing tendencies and bringing out issues for discussion. Further, the limited
representation of informants might have influenced the validity of the primary data. Likewise,
from a reliability perspective, it would have been preferable to have a broader geographical,
sector and institutional representation from all three stakeholder groups. E.g. only two people
form Government were interviewed of which both work for the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Affairs. It can not be ruled out that other sector specific ministries might have other
views and standpoints on CSO engagement. At the same time it could be argued that since the
Government has expressed an official standpoint on the issue in the Joint Assistance Strategy for
Tanzania (JAST)18, to which all ministries are supposed to align, a broader representation might
not be necessary as divergences in perception is not expected between the national ministries.
Still, it could have been beneficial to capture the perceptions of Local Governmental Authorities
(LGAs) as they might have different experiences of CSOs participation and aid effectiveness
processes.
Likewise, there has been a poor representation of rural CSOs. There are reasons to believe that
CSOs outside urban metropolis like Dar es Salaam and Arusha have different experiences
regarding their role in aid effectiveness. Unfortunately due to the limited time frames, resources
and in some cases unwillingness by stakeholders to participate it has not been feasible to extend
the stakeholder representation. However, it is expected that, in consideration of the purpose and
exploratory character of the study, the data gathered is reliable to a satisfying degree and
extensive enough to do initial analysis on the topic.
18 See Appendix 2 for Glossary
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3 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework  
In this chapter a conceptual/theoretical framework will be constructed. For reasons given earlier
this chapter will be based on overarching theories concerning civil society and CSOs in
development. A shorter discussion regarding the concept of aid effectiveness will also be given.
The ambition is not to give a fully-fledged conceptual discussion but rather to 1) show that aid
effectiveness entails both technical and socio-political aspects and 2) clarify howaid effectiveness
will be considered in the Thesis.
3.1 Civil Society and CSOs 
As stated, the thesis will focus upon CSOs in aid effectiveness rather than civil society at large.
However as the concepts are closely related, and sometimes even considered equivalent, it is
difficult not to touch upon civil society in this kind of framework.
3.1.1 Civil Society  
The discourse of civil society has a long academic history dating back to Age of Enlightenment
but was established first in the twenty-first century within the development discourse (Mcllwaine
1998). Many attempts have been done in trying to define the concept of civil society. Yet, no
definition has been as widelyused as Gordon White’s: White considers civil societyto be:
An intermediate associational realm between state and family populated by organisations which
are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by
members of societyto protect or extend their interests or values (White 1994:379)
The broadness of this definition has made it popular amongst development actors, donors,
research institutes, CSOs, Governments etc. However, as concluded by Pedersen 2001:3): “It
offers little guidance in terms of how to apply the concept in the context of development aid".
Overall, “critics have decried the conceptual and practical usefulness of civil society for reasons
of ambiguity and empirical diffuseness" (Howell & Pearce 2001:1). In order to avoid this
discussion and possible diffuseness this study focus on CSOs as they are not only clearly
developmental in their nature, but also normativelyperceived as organised representatives of civil
society(ibid).
3.1.2 CSOs in Development  
Like civil society there is no common definition capable of reflecting the variety of
organisational objectives, structures, activities, resources etc. that CSOs represent (Reality Check
2008). In the broadest sense it could be argued that CSOs “…include all non-market and non-
state organisations in which people organise themselves to pursue shared interests in the public
domain” (AGCSAE 2007:3). Accordingly, a multitude of associations, e.g. non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), community/faith-based organisations, private sector associations, co-
operatives, research institutes etc., are often incorporated to the CSO concept (Ingelstam &
Karlstedt 2007). Yet, what they do have in common is a normative expectation of independence
from Government and DP agendas and that they are working on behalf of society in pleno or
representing a specific civic group (ibid).
Today CSOs are widely recognised amongst development practitioners as important actors in
national development (Mcllwaine 1998). Likewise, proponents of different theoretical
perspectives support CSO participation in development. (Pedersen 2001: Howell & Pearce 2001).
However, these theoretical perspectives present multiple normative understanding of CSOs in
regard to their functions in society and their relation to the state (ibid).. E.g. Neo-liberals
predominately consider CSOs as alternative actors to the state for provision of social services
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whilst Pluralists rather think of CSOs as counter-weighting agents to the state power by acting
within existing structures (ibid). Structuralists, on the other hand, promote “fundamental change
of unequal power structures from below” (Pedersen 2001:4-5). However this adaptableness of
the notion "also adds to the confusion when different and potentially contradictory development
objectives are combined into one strategy" (ibid)
However, it could be argued to be a general consensus among development practitioners that
CSOs, as organisations ‘of and by the people’, well situated to “…understand the needs and
claims of ordinary people and build multiple relationships with communities who are the agents
and beneficiaries of development efforts” and to “…promote people’s participation and
democratic action and reflect the values of socio-economic justice and solidarity as
citizens"(RealityCheck 2008:39/6).
As this implies, CSOs have, in relation to poverty reduction and social development many
important roles to playand functions to fulfil. Amongst them are:
 Representation of the interest of specific civic groups
 Mobilization of social actors to increase their consciousness and impact.
 Regulation and monitoring of state performance and over the actions of public officials.
 Developmental or social action to improve the well-being of their constituencies (DIIS
2004:3).
3.1.3 Concerns 
Even though CSOs are normatively perceived to be pro bono publico it should be kept in mind that
CSOs:
…are complex associational universes…they contain repression as well as democracy,
conflict as well as co-operation, vice as well as virtue: they can be motivated by sectional
greed as much as social interest (Robinson & White 1997:3)
In regard to this the problem of CSOs having to sacrificing their autonomy due to strong donor
dependency in form of funding is often mentioned as a weakness of and threat to CSOs.
Likewise the increasing international requirement and funding conditionality of CSO
participation might reifying CSOs as “historically inevitable components” byoverlooking the past
and present socio-politics dynamics in the specific countries (Howell &Pearce 2001:2). Overall,
attempts by donors and domestic Governments to operationalise CSOs threaten to reduce the
notion to a mere technical tool and by that “…depoliticize it in a way that paradoxically could
lead to a constriction of intellectual and political space" (ibid). Hence, as advocated by several
scholars, neither CSOs nor civil society should be externally manufactured but rather given space
to transform in their own way(ibid. Pedersen 2001:Mcllwaine 1998).
3.2 Aid Effectiveness  
The demand for greater aid effectiveness has grown stronger over the last decade in light of
unprecedented transaction costs and insufficient effects of aid on poverty (Reality Check 2008).
The international discourse on aid effectiveness is predominately guided by the Paris Declaration
and Accra Agenda for Action19 (Hauer 2006). The thoroughgoing aspiration of these agendas is
to give recipient countries more influence and responsibility over their own development
19 See Appendix 2 for Glossary
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strategies and the process of allocating aid (ibid). The donors are inclined to find new methods
for accommodating their aid better to the national context of the partner countries (ibid). To
achieve greater aid effectiveness the signatories have agreed on five respective four committing
principles (See Boxes 1 and 2) 
Box 1 Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness 
Box 2 Accra Agenda Principles on Aid Effectiveness 
In practise these principles have transferred into institutional and technical reformation and
harmonisation of DP and Government aid delivery systems (Reality Check 2007). The
effectiveness of aid is hence measured in lowered transaction costs between DPs and
Governments (ibid). This wayof practice aid effectiveness has been subject to criticism due to its
technicalityand exclusion of CSOs (Tomlinson 2008). As argued byCSOs “...the true measure of
aid effectiveness is a sustained reduction of povertyand inequality in the poorest countries, where
aid is a key resource” (ibid:4). Or as expressed elsewhere: "the purpose of aid effectiveness is not
aid effectiveness, but households escaping impoverishment, and people realizing concrete
changes in their lives" (Rajani 2008). From this perspective, where aid effectiveness is about the
Accra Principles 
Predictability: Donors will provide 3-5 year forward information in their
planned aid to partner countries
Country Systems: Partner countrysystems will be used to deliver aid as the first option,
rather than donor systems.
Conditionality: Donors will switch from reliance on prescriptive conditions about
howand when aid moneyis spent to conditions based on the
developing country's own development objectives.
Untying: Donors will relax restrictions that prevent developing countries
from buying the goods and services theyneed from whomever and
wherever theycan get the best qualityat the lowest price. (OECD)
Source: http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3343,en_2649_33721_41297219_1_1_1_1,00.html
Paris Principles 
Ownership: Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty
reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption
Alignment: Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local
systems.
Harmonisation: Donor countries coordinate, simplifyprocedures and
share information to avoid duplication.
Results: Developing countries and donors shift focus to development
results and results get measured
Mutual Accountability: Donors and partners are accountable for
development results. (OECD)
Source: http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_3236398_35401554_1_1_1_1,00.html
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actual impact on the ground, the issue of incorporating CSOs as policy stakeholders becomes
utterly relevant (Tomlinson 2008). Accordingly, I will not delimit the understanding of aid
effectiveness herein to the mere technical aspect of it, but also to be considerate of its more
socio-political dimensions. This implies that I will investigate CSO engagement in processes
surrounding e.g. national development programmes, poverty reduction strategies and aid
harmonisation initiatives.
3.3 Previous Research 
Lastly in this chapter it should be recognised that an overarching studyregarding aid effectiveness
and CSOs has been done by the Advisory Groups on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness20.
However, this research was conducted in the pre-Accra period aimed at making the Accra High
level Forum recognising CSOs as valued partners in aid effectiveness. The purpose of this study
was accordingly, from a theoretical point of view, argue for the importance of letting CSOs
participate in aid effectiveness. Hence, byaddressing the same topic, but in the post-Accra period
form a specific contextual perspective and with research questions taking the debate further, the
Thesis will not onlybuild upon this research but also ad to the scope of it.
20 See AGCSAE (2007) Civil Societyand Aid Effectiveness at http://web.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cs
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4 Contextual Background  
In this chapter the discussion of CSOs and aid effectiveness will be taken further by
contextualising it to Tanzania. First a description of the Tanzanian civil society will be given.
Secondly, the historyof aid effectiveness in the countrywill be outlined.
4.1 Civil Society in Tanzania 
Herein an overview of the Tanzanian civil society will be given in order to get a better
understanding of the environment CSOs are operating in. Through this it is also anticipated that
the readers will become more considerate of obstacles, opportunities and possibilities facing
CSOs in taking their 'seat at the table'.
Historically the relationship between civil society and the Government of Tanzania has been
characterised by the “…state’s constant efforts to create political hegemony” (Lange et al
2000:18). Little space has been given civil society to growand develop as a sphere that is separate
and relatively independent from the state (ibid). E.g. during the Presidency of Nyerere
organisations engaging in political opposition were forbidden (Hydén 1999). Nevertheless, as the
state realised the importance of having a civil society that at least was perceived by external
parties as functioning, they tried to establish a state controlled civil society (Kasfir 2004:Hydén
2005). Hence there has been a tradition of looking upon civil society as an ‘extended arm’ of
government and CSOs have been expected to engage directly in service delivery. Therefore there
is an inherited ‘culture of silence’ limiting civil society in criticising government (ibid). Beside, the
sprawled population and poor infrastructure connecting communities have contributed to a weak
tradition of social mobilisation and assembly, especially in rural areas (Kasfir 2004). Generally,
there is a poorly developed rural civil society as the majority of the CSOs are based in the bigger
cities. Overall, the Tanzanian civil society lacks civicness and does not have the urge or incentive to
engage in collective assemblies and co-operations (Lang et al 2000: Hydén 1999)
Since the time of Nyerere there has however been an intensified democratisation and
decentralisation process causing Government control over civil society to weaken.
Simultaneously there has been a remarkable growth in CSOs in Tanzania (Lange et al 2000).
Through the development of a ‘NGO policy’ in 2001 and with current aid reformation processes
civil society has formally become recognised as an important actor in national development and
democratization (ibid). Regardless, there are still tendencies of a hegemonic approach by
Government vis á vis civil society, which is exemplified by the case study in box 3, and several
control mechanisms are practiced (Lange et al 2000). E.g. all organisations in Tanzania must be
registered and approved by a counsel which is nominated by Government. As this process is
quite complicated and expensive it tends to marginalise smaller and financially-weak organisations
(Utrikesdepartementet 2007). Furthermore, no private media is allowed national coverage (ibid).
Another aspect limiting CSOs is their high dependency on funding. “[I]n Tanzania, organisations
tend to be formed by resource persons, who reach out to the grass-roots, not the other way
around” (Lange et al 2000:15). Moreover, as popular participation is generally very low in
Tanzania manyCSOs struggle with lowmemberships.
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Box 3 Case Study - HakiElimu
As to CSO participation in national development there is very little documentation about actual
CSO involvement and contribution. Overall it seems like CSOs engagement in aid effectiveness
processes and in national development in general, has been verylimited and ad hoc (Field Notes).
Nonetheless, there are a few instances in which CSOs have been given the possibility to
participate. E.g. during the drafting of the Poverty Reduction Strategy consultations between
CSOs and Government took place (Curran 2005). However:
The general feeling CSOs have about the first PRPS is that they did not really have
any impact on the policy content of the strategy and that the document does not
reflect civil society's perspective or inputs in a meaningful way(ibid:10)
Likewise, whereas the importance of CSO representation in various policy-making fora has
'formally' been recognised bythe Government several CSOs claim that such invitations rather is a
cabotinage by Government in order to 'tick the civil participation box' (Personal Communication
with UNCSAC members).
4.2 Aid Effectiveness in Tanzania 
Tanzania is commonly regarded as a star-pupil in aid effectiveness (DPG 2006). Not only does
Tanzania have records of innovations in aid management reforms for over a decade, but the 2008
Survey on Monitoring the Paris Declaration concluded that Tanzania already in 2007 was in the
forefront of achieving the aid effectiveness goals set bythe agenda (OECD 2007).
Case Study  HakiElimu 
HakiElimu is a non-governmental organisation that was established in 2001 with the vision to
"see that every child in Tanzania is able to enjoy her or his right to basic quality education"
(HakiElimu 2009). In 2001 the Government of Tanzania initiated a Primary Education
Development Project and in 2004 the Government decided to undertake a national Public
Expenditure Tracking Survey on it (U4 2007). The responsibility of conducting the Tracking
was given to the research institute REPOA. The result presented by REPOA indicated a
number of drawbacks with the Project. However, “the Ministry of Finance quickly issued a
rebuttal questioning the methodological authenticity of the REPOA study” (U4 2007:3). Based
on this report HakiElimu published a ‘review of the reviews’ in August 2005 criticising the
Tanzanian school system and the Primary Education Development Project (Jensen 2006:1)
Further, as outlined in U4:
The report was combined with a series of popular and widely watched television and radio
adverts illustrating the problems of corruption and mismanagement in the education sector.
This strongly irritated the Minister of Education and the then President, Benjamin Mkapa (U4
2007:4)
The Minister of Education advocated that the report was biased and too critical, missing out
on the actual ameliorations that had been done in the education system. The popular adverts
were perceived to ridicule the Government and being an election year in 2005 the Government
took action against HakiElimu (Tanzanian Affairs 2006:1). The Government banned the
organisation in October the same year and prohibited them hence to publish any more articles
or reports regarding the school system. This act was condemned by many domestic CSOs and
non-domestic actors. However, this did not stop the Government from threatening to punish
media, schools, organisations etc. that operated with HakiElimu (Legal Human Right Centre
2006)."It was only significant public and possibly high level diplomatic pressure that stopped
the Government from banning the organisation altogether" (U4 2007:3).
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The requisite of enhancing aid effectiveness in Tanzania was initially driven by a crisis in the
relationship between DPs and Government in mid 1990s. In response to this a group of
independent advisers was commissioned to give recommendations on how to improve overall
development cooperation in Tanzania (JAST 2006). Part of the recommendations, adopted by
both parties in 1997, urged Government to articulate medium- and long-term national
development priorities and to reform the financial management system. DPs were encouraged to
"...better coordinate and harmonise their development assistance...as well as to increase the
predictabilityof aid flows" (ibid:3). The parties also agreed to, in joint actions, "...strive for greater
transparency, improved accountability and promote increased involvement for civil society"
(DPG 2006:21). The initiative of improving aid effectiveness was taken further with independent
assessments of Tanzania's development partnership in 1997, 1999 and 2000 and the formalization
of an Independent Monitoring Group in 2002 (JAST 2006).
In 2002 the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS), a medium-term framework for development co-
operation, was launched. TAS, aimed at "...strengthening aid coordination, harmonisation and
alignment as well as national ownership and Government leadership of the development process"
(ibid:3). The implementation of it led to considerable improvements in national aid
harmonization, predictability and management (DPG 2006). Due to the demand for better donor
harmonization and clearer Division of Labour (DoL) between donors, DPs formalised a
coordinating body called the Development Partners Group (DPG)21 in 2004. The ambition of
this was to incline DPs to “...speak with one voice on keydevelopment issues” (DPG 2006:22).
Regardless of progress made under TAS parallel systems for managing, monitoring, delivering
and evaluate development assistance were still in place causing high transaction costs. Therefore a
Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) was developed in 2006. Compared to TAS, JAST
intends to be more encompassing by considering "...all aspects of the development partnership
between the Government and the Development Partners as well as the role of non-state actors
therein". Accordingly, JAST was aligned to the domestic Poverty Reduction Strategies22 and to
the international aid effectiveness frameworks23. (JAST 2006:4).
JAST aims at establishing an effective development partnership by:
 Strengthening national ownership and Government leadership of the development
process,

 Aligning Development Partner support to Government priorities, systems, structures and
procedures,

 Harmonising Government and Development Partners process,

 Managing resources for achieving development result,
 Ensuring mutual accountabilityof the Government and Development Partners; and
 Strengthening accountability of the Government to the citizens of Tanzania". (JAST
2006:5)
What distinguish JAST from previous initiatives is that it not only recognises CSOs as important
actors in aid effectiveness but that it also specifies expected roles of CSOs:
21 See Appendix 2 for Glossary
22 The MKUKUTA and the MUKUZA
23 I.e. the MonterreyConsensus, Rome, declaration, Marrakech Memorandum and Paris Declaration
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Local and international CSOs mobilise and enhance community participation and resource
contribution in development activities and act as partners to the Government and
Development Partners in delivering community services. CSOs also participate in local
government planning and in reviewing development strategies including the
MKUKUTA/MKUZA, programmes and projects, the national budget process, and JAST
implementation, and disseminate relevant information with attention to its creditability and
user-friendliness to the public. They thus facilitate mutual accountability of the Government
and Development Partners as well as domestic accountability of the Government...In
addition, they engage in dialogue with the Government and Development Partners and
consolidate and present community views to the Government and Development Partners.
They also serve as domestic and international advocates for development and aid
effectiveness, stimulate public debate and raise understanding on these issues (ibid:7)
Further, a Dialogue Structure24 and a rationalised DoL, dividing DP contributions in regard to
key development areas25 were presented in JAST as main mechanisms for aid effectiveness.
However, as national and sector dialogues still took place with overlapping agendas and with
unclear linkages, the government proposed in 2008 a new Dialogue Structure and DoL26
(Government of Tanzania 2008). Apart from being more straightforward and homogeneous, the
new structure acknowledges the importance of, apart from Government and DPs, "other
domestic stakeholders (non-state actors)" in all dialogue fora (ibid:1). At the time of writing the
new structure was not fully operational since the proposed DoL had raised some concerns
amongst DPs as to upon whose criteria is it to be determined which DP that is to operate in what
sector dialogue27.
24 See ’old Dialogue Structure’ in Appendix 7
25 See Appendix 8 for a schedule over the Clusters, Sectors and Thematic Areas identified by the
Poverty reduction Strategy as key development areas for Tanzania. The DoL is also built around
these working groups.
26 See ‘newDialogue Structure’ in Appendix 7
27 For updates on this process please consult The DPG Secretariat at the DPG web-page:
http://www.tzdpg.or.tz
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5 CSOs in aid effectiveness – stakeholders’ perceptions  
In this chapter the results from the interviews will be presented and analysed in course with the
research questions. Apart from the question specific analyses given in direct connection to the
presentation of the result of each research question, an end-analysis will round off the chapter.
5.1 Roles of CSOs 
It came forward in the interviews that CSO engagement in national aid effectiveness is
important, necessary and welcomed. The interviewed stakeholders widely expected and
encouraged CSOs to contribute more to the agenda. The Government officials and most
interviewed DPs referred to JAST when discussing perceived roles of CSOs in aid effectiveness
(GoTab:DP1-5:DP8-10). Even though none of the CSO representatives specifically made
reference to JAST theyidentified the same roles. According to JAST (see above) CSOs are to:
 Deliver communityservices;
 Support government in planning, implementing and evaluating governmental lead
development programmes;
 Represent the ‘voice’ of the people;
 Disseminate information;
 Act as policyadvocators for development and aid effectiveness.
Due to this consensus I will let the roles identified byJAST structure the presentation below.
Service Delivery/Implementation  
There seems to be a contention within Government that CSOs predominately are to engage in
service delivery. As expressed bythe officials:
CSOs role is to implement and complement Government in providing communities with
services (GoTb).
CSOs should in collaboration with Local Government Authorities mobilise resources at
community level to support local development projects. CSOs can provide communities
with hospitals and schools, but letting government have control of the instances in order to
guarantee sustainabilityin and qualityof the delivery. (GoTa)
The contention that CSOs should engage in service delivery has also been expressed by most
CSO representatives. As one participant expressed:
The whole idea with civil society is to complement Government's efforts to implement
policies and directions given for development (CSO1).
Yet, it should be noted that many CSOs informants perceived service delivery to be one of many
functions and not necessarily as the most important one (CSO2:CSO4-5). One CSO
representative explained that:
The basic responsibility of delivering aid is Government's, but Government structures must
sometimes be supported, complemented and informed bycivil societystructures (CSO2).
DPs on the other hand were more reluctant towards seeing service deliveryas a primary function
of CSOs in aid effectiveness:
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CSOs are not supposed to cover up for Government where they have failed to deliver; it is
not up to CSOs to supply Tanzania with e.g. education and health care systems. That is the
role of Government. CSOs should rather demand and pressure Government to deliver these
services (DP6a).
As will become evident later on in the chapter, DPs are rather pushing CSOs to play a more
adversarial role.
Evaluation and monitoring 
Predominately, DPs and CSO representatives stressed that CSOs have an important function to
fulfil in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of aid effectiveness processes - especially in light of
increased General Budget Support28 (CSO1:DP9). CSO led M&E presents a civic tool for
controlling Government delivery(DP9-10:CSO1:CSO4):
It is crucial that CSOs evaluate if the central system actually delivers the required services
and that the aid money trickles down society now when the money are pooled to
Government. (DP5)
Or as a CSO representative expressed it:
We are to make sure that Government is not repeating any mistakes and we do that by
activelyscrutinizing them. (CSO6)
Interesting to point out is that the majority of CSOs argued that M&E should be undertaken in
close collaboration with Government (CSO1:CSO3-6). The DPs on the other hand stressed that
CSOs, apart from M&E, should actively challenge the accountability of implementation and
demanding performance of Government (DP9). Whilst the M&E function of CSOs is identified
byJAST the interviewed Government officials did not bring it up.
Information dissemination 
The necessity of CSOs to be continuously engaged throughout aid effectiveness processes have
been emphasised in the interviews. Hence, CSO contribution in planning and decision-making of
aid effectiveness strategies, especially in the role of informants and civic spokesmen, is perceived
vital. Several CSO representatives argued that information dissemination, both up- and down-
stream, to be the most crucial CSO contribution to aid effectiveness. (CSO2:CSO4-6)
Information dissemination is not only important for having an informed national debate on
aid effectiveness but also to raise public awareness concerning national development
processes. (CSO4)
This informative link provided by CSOs was also recognised by Government and DPs as
important since it allows CSOs to represent civic groups and make the 'voice' of marginalised
people heard (GoTab:DP1:DP5:DP9). Further, it was widely argued that through grass-root
dialogues CSOs can give feedback to Government regarding development initiatives, policies and
priorities (DP2:DP10:CSO3:GoTa). By pushing for certain civic groups or causes and informing
about the actual poverty picture, CSOs play an important role in problematising national aid
effectiveness priorities and programmes (CSO4:DP9). Furthermore with local knowledge:
CSOs should play a challenging function, an accountability function and an advocacy
function on account of their constituents (DP9).
28 See Appendix 2 Glossary
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Policy advocators 
With increased usage of governmental system for aid donation there is according to DPs a clear
need for CSOs to accompany government with an advocacy function rather than a service
deliveryfunction (DP1):
CSOs should not function as the extended arm of Government. There must be a move
towards adversarial CSOs that focus much more on political difficult issues such as
accountability, human rights, governance, corruption etc. CSOs need to be the critical voice
against Government so to hold them accountable outside the democratic processes. Today
we see that CSOs are not as critical towards Government as we would like to see. (DP4)
The CSO representatives also argued that a policy-advocating function is of importance (CSO1-
5). Through advocacy CSOs can increase awareness of Government and DPs regarding specific
matters and social situations and by that contribute to informed decision-making (CSO1:CSO3-
4). Likewise, by acting as watch-dogs CSOs can critically scrutinize and hold Government and
DPs accountable for their actions (CSO1:CSO3-5). The Government official also pinpointed the
value of having a scrutinizing and adversarial civil society as it contributes to more dynamic
national dialogues (GoTa). Yet they stressed that Tanzanian CSOs are not capable of fulfilling
these functions due to lacking capacityand experience in the area (GoTab):
CSOs today are not advocating or constructively scrutinizing. They are only criticising us.
(GoTa)
5.1.1 Analysis  
Initially the seemingly general positive stance towards CSO engagement in aid effectiveness
should be highlighted. An initial recognition of the importance of CSO engagement is the first
and most important step toward seeing CSOs as valued partners in aid effectiveness.
Out of above outline three main analytical conclusions to draw in regard to the first research
question. Firstly, there are several different roles ascribed to CSOs by the stakeholders of which
no one really has been given priority by the stakeholders. One explanation to this could be the
“multiple normative understandings” of CSOs as mentioned in the theoretical framework.
Further it could be difficult to identify one predominant role or function due to the dynamic
nature of CSOs. Yet, there is nothing that says that CSOs are to play one role or fulfil one
function in aid effectiveness. As argued by Howell and Pearce (2001) the strength of CSOs lies
within their diversity. Secondly, it seems that the identified roles are 'traditional' ones in the sense
that they are ascribed CSOs in overall development frameworks. Accordingly, there seems not to
be any aid effectiveness or country specific roles. This can be due to the fact that aid
effectiveness, if recognising its socio-political aspects, is closely interlinked with general national
development frameworks. Thirdly, even if the stakeholders seem to generally agree in the
multiplicity of functions CSOs could play a possible perceptional discrepancy could be the
tendency of DPs to push for a more adversarial and challenging role of CSOs whereas
Government is clinging on to the notion of CSOs as service delivers. This suggests that the
Government are more aligned to the neo-liberal perspective on CSOs whereas DPs tend to be
more Pluralistic. The CSOs themselves seems more torn between the two extremes.
There are a number of issues that could be pondered about in relation to this suggested
discrepancy. Firstly it must become clear what is meant with service deliveryand advocacyas well
as whose and what the expectations are. Service delivery as such can be carried out in different
arrangements and objectives for each function. If a CSO is forced to, either due to the direct
demand of Government or indirectly due to Government’s failure in delivering public goods, do
service delivery it could hamper the autonomy of the organisation since it is not given the
possibilityto chose if to, and in such case, what to deliver. Nevertheless, being the ‘extended arm’
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of Government does not have to be counter-productive if built upon a consensus building
partnership where CSOs are engage to set the agenda. Advocacy, being a western derived
concept, is in its most straightforward notion the pursuit of influencing outcomes (QPPD). If
being considerate of the facts that 1) there is not a strong tradition of public movements in
Tanzania and 2) CSOs have a long history as service deliverers, a paradigm shift towards a more
adversarial and scrutinizing function of CSOs might not be as easy as DPs might perceive. CSOs
are simply not used to question or oppose Government in a critical manner and the Government
is not used to be criticised. As the HakiElimu case testifies such behavioural change of CSOs
might cause tensions and confusions between CSOs and Government - leading to non-conducive
and oppressing behaviour of the Government.
Considering this it might be desirable to allow a different kind of advocacy develop, that is
considerate of the socio-dynamic history of civil society and its relation to Government in order
to achieve a conducive environment for CSOs to influence decision-making without colliding
with Government. Maybe advocacy in the form of negotiation and consensus building would be
more conducive in Tanzania. As stated, in its most straightforward notion advocacy is the pursuit
of influencing outcomes, which could be achieved equally well through negotiation and
consensus building.
5.2 Participatory Mechanisms 
It stands clear from the study that there already exist mechanisms formally allowing CSO
participation. Accordingly, most informants argued that there is no need to develop new
participatory mechanisms per se but that the quality of those already in place must be enhanced.
E.g. the existing mechanisms are more on an ad hoc basis rather than parts of an on-going and
systematic participatory-dialogue process (CSO3:CSO6). Further, present fora of stakeholder
dialogue is more tailored to meet DPs' needs and requirements rather than CSOs (DP7:CSO3-4).
Nonetheless, following participatorymechanisms were identified bythe interviewees.
Dialogue Forum  
Regular and informed stakeholder dialogues were concluded by the informants to be the most
important participatory mechanism for CSOs in regard to aid effectiveness. This as such on-
going dialogues contribute with a framework allowing CSOs to disseminate information,
represent peoples' views and to engage in policy advocacy (DP2:DP5-8:CSO1:CSO3-4).
Particularly, since 2008 when Government started to invite CSOs to the annual Poverty Policy
Week and General Budget Support reviews29, these consultative meetings were frequently
mentioned as good frameworks for CSOs to contribute to policy-making and priority setting
(GoTa:CSO3-5:DP2-5:DP8-9). However, as pinpointed by several informants; whilst the
structure of the fora is conducive in a generic sense, the quality of the stakeholder dialogues
taking place within these meetings is often very low (CSO1-4:DP1-8:GoTb). Moreover, as
explained by one DP, when the policy dialogue has reached the level of Poverty Policy Week and
General Budget Support reviews it:
...is more or less a done deal and there is little room for negotiation. Hence for a fruitful
participation CSOs must be involved in the pre-cocking stage of the policies as well. There
need to be an ongoing policy dialogue throughout the year between all stakeholders. There
must likewise be some kind of system of dialogues that ideallybrings the voices of the grass-
roots to structured sector and stakeholder as well as national dialogue forums that are lean
enough to undertake a meaningful information exchange (DP9).
29 See Appendix 2 for glossary
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The Government officials and three DPs (DP8:DP4:DP10) mentioned the new Dialogue
Structure as the primary system for achieving this. Other informants suggested, without referring
to the Structure, that a 'tripartite system' where effected DPs, Government ministries and CSOs
in a certain sector can come together to discuss and work out policies in order to get an informed
benchmark for funding allocation, programming, monitoring etc. should be established
(CSO1:DP2).
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys 
As to the M&E role of CSOs it was suggested that whereas DPs and Government engage in
Public Expenditure Review dialogues concerning challenges in cash flows from central to local
level, CSOs could be engaged by conducting Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) (See
Box 3) at local level (DP5:DP3b:CSO5). Originally PETS have been conducted by DPs but it is
becoming more common that CSOs adapt the methodology in order to monitor cash flows of
aid money(Graaf 2005).
Box 4 Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys 
According to some DPs, the development, adaptation and extension of PETS could be a good
mechanism for CSOs to monitor howaid money flows through society and to evaluate the result
of Government's investments at local level (DP5). Bythis CSOs complement PER measurements
taken at central level (DP5:CSO6). Further:
By conducting PETS CSOs can move away form being service delivers and move towards
becoming monitors of Government delivery(DP5).
What are Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys?  
A Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) tracks the flow of public funds and material
resources from the central government level, through the administrative hierarchy, and out to
the frontline service providers. The aim is to improve the quality of service delivery at the local
level, and the key question that a PETS sets out to answer is: Do public funds and material resources
end up where theyare supposed to? If theydon’t, the surveymaygo further and ask: Whyare those funds
being diverted? Such surveys are typically implemented at the sector level, usually in health or
education. (U4 2007:1)
“PETS ultimately intend to provide local communities with information about the level of
resources allocates in particular services in their area; perhaps to the local school or health clinic”
Most commonlyPETS are carried out “mainlybydonor agencies to trail their funds”. However,
more recently “the methodology is copied by civil society organizations to increase
accountability and responsiveness of local governments. The rational is that with demonstrating
howmoney is transferred or spent at different bureaucratic levels, the local decision makers can
be held accountable to those civil societyorganizations” (Graaf 2005:1)
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys in Tanzania 
In Tanzania three national PETS have been conducted: 1999 (PWC), 2001 (REPOA/ESRF) and
2003 (World Bank) (U4 2007). Apart form these there have been a number of other PETS
carried out at the district level by Non-State Actors (PWC, REPOA, ESRF, HakiKazi,
TEN/MET, TCDD, KCSPR Forum and ActionAid) (Graaf 2005). However the result of these
PETS “are not shared widely, little is known about the impact the studies have had and collected
data is not compared” (Graaf 2005:2)
Further information: http://www.u4.no/themes/pets/main.cfm
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If used and communicated in the right way CSO led PETS could also increase the understanding
and awareness of the situation of ordinary citizens at community level - which per se would
strengthen the information disseminating function of CSOs (CSO6).
One of the DPs informed that their agency provides training in PETS for CSOs (D3b).
However, as explained:
The PETS we do is not only one survey, but what we had in mind was more of building an
information system so that communities are trained to do PETS on a more continuing basis.
(DP3b)
Likewise a CSO representative informed that they were developing simple sector surveys in
Swahili aimed for the usage of ordinarypeople at local level:
We must be enabled to go e.g. to a school and ask howmany teachers it got, howmany of
them are professional, when was the last time theygot a capacitation grant and howwas that
money spent etc. And then communicate this information to the local and central
authorities. However, so far there has been little interest of these surveys from the
government authorities. (CSO5) 
Local Government Authorities 
A further way for CSOs to become integrated in aid effectiveness processes, identified by the
CSOs themselves, is to initiate closer collaborations with LGAs. A closer collaboration could
help CSOs to strengthening their relationship with the central Government since LGAs function
as 'gateways' to core dialogues and processes (CSO5). Besides, several CSOs experienced it to be
easier to collaborate with LGAs than with the central Government since it is possible to establish
a more ‘personal’ cooperation with LGAs (CSO2:CSO5-6):
At the regional or district level, where government officials work more directly with CSOs
there is no longer an abstract misconception since the collaboration is individually based.
(CSO5).
Umbrellas and Networks 
The formation of umbrella organisations and networks were frequently mentioned by CSO
representatives as a predominant way to strengthen their influence in aid effectiveness.
Particularly they argued that umbrella organisations help CSOs to, like DPs, ‘speak with one
voice’ and by that strengthening them as counterparts (CSO2:CSO4-5): Likewise it was stressed
that local community based networks are necessary for effective communication flows within
civil society (CSO5). Moreover, it was recognised that for CSOs to become stronger in national
sector dialogues, it might be beneficial to establish and strengthen sector networks (CSO5).
Not all CSO representatives were however convinced that umbrellas add value. One CSO
representative argued that umbrella organisations in Tanzania have never worked as they "simply
are useless" (CSO4). An alternative, suggested bya CSO informant, was to rather create space for
CSOs to dialogue with each other around specific matters:
I think that dialogue forums work better in regard to networking and partnership than
initiating formal structures for membership based organisations (CSO1)
Similarly most DPs argued that umbrellas do not have any comparative advantage in sector or
national dialogues (DP1:DP3-5:DP7). The rationale is that umbrellas tend to become too general
and broad in their mission so that they loose expertise, and by that bargain power (DP5). DPs
rather expressed a general preference to collaborate with sector specialised CSOs due to their
"front edged competence" (DP5). It was commonly argued amongst DPs that since Government
and DPs are organised around sectors CSOs should, in terms of policy dialogue, organise
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themselves according to the same system (DP2). The Government on the other hand stressed the
importance of keeping a dialogue with umbrellas in higher levels of dialogue but acknowledged
that:
It is important not to only dialogue with umbrella organisations as it is not always the case
that umbrella organisations understand the things discussed during sector reviews since they
have not been involved throughout the year in the sector working groups. That is why
participation of specialised CSOs in sector working groups are important as well (GoTa)
Media 
Regarding mechanisms for CSOs to become more adversarial the role of media was raised. A few
CSO representatives stressed the importance of recognising the usefulness of media in mobilising
people, changing perceptions and increasing popular awareness (CSO1-2). Hence it was stressed
that CSOs should make more use of media in conveying messages so to pressure Government
into listen to them (CSO1-2:DP7).
5.2.1 Analysis 
Considering the focus given dialogue and information sharing it is interesting to highlight that,
apart from the Government officials, only three of the interviewed DPs (DP8:DP4:DP10), and
none of the CSOs representatives, mentioned the new Dialogue Structure. As explained above
the Structure is supposed to be the dialogue system in Tanzania by guaranteeing participation of
all stakeholders, at all levels and sectors throughout the year.
Why then has the recognition of the new Dialogue Structure been so low? The most
straightforward explanation is that the awareness of the new Dialogue Structure is low. Whilst
this might be true for CSOs, if considering the fact that they have not so far participated in
drafting or implementing the structure, DPs have been given the document are involved in the
current implementation process (Personal Communication DPG Personnel). The lowrecognition
by DPs could possible be explained by their non-compliance to the Government suggested DoL.
Overall the low awareness suggest the need to actually communicate the newDialogue Structure
to a wider set of stakeholders. If CSOs are expected to participate in and contribute to the
process they must at least be made aware of the structure’s existence and its intended
implications. Furthermore, if CSOs are to, as urged by the Accra Agenda, to be regarded as
valued parties, it it seems straightforward to included CSOs in the implementation process of the
newDialogue Structure right away.
It should however be acknowledged that, whilst the implementation of the Dialogue Structure
could help CSOs to become integrated in aid effectiveness dialogues and policy-making
processes, the structure is limited to the national level. I.e. it does not automaticallyguarantee up-
and down-stream information flows and dialogues. As concluded in the theoretical framework
the strength and value added of CSOs in many aspects is their representation of the people and
their knowledge of the local poverty situation. Thereof, a strong foundation for CSO
contribution in aid effectiveness depends on the local level being connected with the national
level. Accordingly, for the Dialogue Structure to function as expected and for CSOs to ad value,
there need to be similar consultations at district, regional and local level supporting the national
processes in terms of information dissemination. E.g. the development of CSO led PETS could
be one way of supporting the national dialogue structure from below. Likewise, initiating closer
collaboration with LGAs could be a way for CSOs to become closer connected both to national
and local processes.
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5.3 Hindrances and Opportunities  
In following sections identified hindrances and opportunities facing CSOs will be outlined. For
structural reasons most of the issues have been clustered together into more overarching
challenges and opportunities.
5.3.1 Hindrances  
A non-conducive environment  
If CSOs are to contribute substantially and constructively they must be given the possibility,
space, time and blessing to do so. Otherwise their efforts will become ad hoc, un-coordinated
and random . However, an overarching hindrance for CSO engagement highlighted by most
informants was the ‘non-conducive environment for CSO engagement’ - impeding stakeholder dialogue,
information sharing, participatorydecision-making and CSO action. (CSO3:CSO5-6:DP1-4:DP8)
A contributing factor to this, as argued byall parties, is the tendencyof counter-fading attitudes of
the stakeholders. CSO representatives perceived Government to sometimes have a repugnant
attitude towards CSO contribution (CSO1:CSO3-5):
There is sometimes a problem with the attitude of Government, I would not say that their
attitude is bad, but they lack understanding of the importance of CSOs and sometimes you feel
like theyare just ignoring us. Theydo not see the value of our contributions (CSO3).
Further:
Unless we are aligning with Government they are regarding us as useless. If an organisation
questions Government it runs the risk of getting in trouble. Whenever an organisation makes
things public that might be uncomfortable for Government it is instantly regarded as opposition
and regarded as nothing else than troublemakers. Trying to operate when being afraid of getting
banned is not conducive. Government must be willing to accept criticism and take it as a
challenge when CSOs dialogue and advocate for change. We are not necessarily criticising. It is
about looking at gaps and challenges and informing Government; look here, something is wrong
and something must be done. (CSO5)
The problem of insecurityfor CSOs was also acknowledged among DPs:
I remember a statement made by the former minister of finance that really frightened me. She
said that: 'we as Government allows the opposition to exist, we allow the multi-party system to
exist and we allowCivil Society to have a voice' (DP9). For me, this is a threat since it indirectly
implies that Government also can take this away if these stakeholders are becoming
'inconvenient' (DP9).
From the Government's point of view constant opposition by CSOs was interpreted as non-
constructive and retrogressive (GoTa):
CSOs are always negative and go against Government. CSOs should not only try to criticise us,
they should try to collaborate with us. Sometimes CSOs could have a better solution to a
problem, but in conveying that they only attack us. They should be more cooperative [...] To
deliberately go against Government no matter what distorts the possibility to a fruitful dialogue.
The Government has made a lot of good achievements, but do CSOs understand and see these
achievements? (GoTa).
CSOs on the other hand considered their attitude to be too non-proactive:
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We are not here to beg for our rights, we are here to demand them. Somehow it is a pressure
from donors that pressures government to listen to us and to invite us to the dialogue, but it
should be us that press for and demand it (CSO4).
Likewise the perceived tendency of DPs to "knowing best" and by that "crowding out" CSOs in
dialogue was understood as a major challenge (CSO1: CSO4-5).
Donors presume that they know what is needed and how it is to be done, but what do they
know about the real poverty situation? They have experts in policy advocacy in e.g. health that
dialogue with the ministryof education without ever having been outside Dar es Salaam (CSO4).
Another challenge contributing to the non-conducive environment is the limited operational space
for CSOs (DP1:DP4:DP7-8:CSO1-4:CSO6). Apart from a limited economic space, i.e. in terms
of funding, many CSOs experienced that they have a narrow and regulated political and public
space to act within (ibid). E.g. difficulties in getting national media coverage for policy advocacy
and information dissemination was mentioned as one issue, apart form the general attitude of
Government, limiting the action space of CSOs (CSO1-2:DP7). The case of HakiElimu was
frequently referred to as an example of the limited and controlled operational space.
Furthermore, national policy formulations and laws regulating the CSO sector were criticised of
being too restrictive (CSO3-4). DPs also stressed the necessity of giving CSOs enough
operational space:
CSOs must be allowed to meet and without external influence think together and come up with
their own strategies and agendas. That is what creates pro-activeness and creativeness (DP8).
Further it was argued that time frames for CSO engagement in aid effectiveness processes are not
conducive. A concern amongst CSOs and DPs was that invitations, information, instructions etc.
from Government often are released too late:
Sometimes you can get an invitation to a sector or consultation meeting the same day and you
get relevant documents at the meeting. Howare we to contribute in these meetings when we do
not have the time to prepare? (CSO4).
Accordingly:
The supply side of the consultative processes need to take into consideration that CSOs need
enough time and space to organise themselves if theyare to participate effectively(DP8).
Moreover, the actual time slots designated CSOs during consultative meetings were perceived too
short for CSOs to conveytheir messages (DP3a:CSO1)
Another discussed aspect was the non-functional upstream and downstream information flows
between and within stakeholder groups - leading to lowinformation exchange and a broken chain
of communication (CSO5). From the CSO perspective a feeling of there being unwillingness,
both at local and central level, to share information have been expressed (CSO2:CSO4-6). This,
as accordingly argued, only contributes to an uninformed and biased dialogue and policy-making
(ibid). In some aspects LGAs have been perceived by CSOs as "bottlenecks" of information,
hindering the outcomes of local and national dialogues to trickle down- as well as upwards the
Governmental and social systems (CSO5).
Lack of information per se was also identified as a major problem for CSOs. There is simply not
enough empirical information regarding the overall poverty situation, specific needs of people,
effects of Government led programmes etc. (CSO1-4:DP3:DP5:DP8:GoTb):
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Sometimes even the simplest information you require, e.g. how many people suffers from
HIV/AIDS, is not existing or is scattered everywhere. Howis civil society supposed to monitoring
and evaluate something we do not know anything about? When there is not enough information
we can not function as a watchdog nor as a support to government and donors, so what should we
do then? (CSO5).
Vague identity of CSOs 
Another perceived obstacle is the 'vague identity' of CSOs (CSO1:CSO6:DP8-9). As argued by
one CSO representative:
Most of the CSOs do not only lack capacity, they also lack a vision. They are not well settled to
understand what they reallywant and what they want to achieve and this vagueness weakens them.
This vagueness will ultimately frustrate Government and donors, making it difficult for CSOs to
gain influence and respect (CSO1).
Several informants argued during the interviews that most CSOs have too broad visions as they
tend to be involved in different sectors simultaneously or change focus of their work repetitively
- causing an impoverishment of expertise (CSO1-5:DP2-4:DP6-9:GoTab). One CSO
representative argued that “CSOs engaging in everything will end up doing nothing” (CSO4).
Connected to this is the tendency of 'brief-case NGOs' (GoTa). As argued by the Government
officials: "These NGOs are only instruments for earning money and they are not good partners
to collaborate with" (GoTa).
Moreover it was emphasised, particularly by the Government officials and DPs, that there is no
clear Division of Labour between CSOs in Tanzania (DP1-3:DP6-8:GoTab). This was perceived
to aggravate CSOs influence in policy dialogue as they loose expertise and front-edged
competence (DP1:DP3-5:DP7:GoTa). Accordingly, as argued, “CSOs simply need to find their
comparative advantage and stick to it” (DP5). The Government representatives also pointed out
the problem with CSOs not being sector orientated:
Since Government and donors are already working according to the sector and thematic areas
division given bythe NewDialogue Structure and CSOs should adopt the same structure as well so
to facilitate a qualified dialogue (GoTb).
However, as identified bythe officials, there are specific cross-cutting issues in which CSOs seem
not to be willing to engage:
Most CSOs want to engage in traditional service delivery sectors, such as health and education,
whilst they avoid thematic areas such as governance, corruption, employment etc. How can we
have CSO participation in these cross-cutting issues when there are no CSOs working with these
questions? (GoTb).
Further, the Government officials and DPs expressed confusion over whether CSOs are doing
advocacy or if they are trying to provide services on behalf of Government, or both. As one DP
put it:
Are they challenging or are they trying to implement - if we do not know, howare we to relate and
support? (DP9).
Likewise the Government officials pointed out that it is very difficult for Government to know
what the CSOs really are doing and whether they “are with us or if they just want to challenge
us” (GoTa). Hence, what is called for is a clearer CSO agenda (DP8):
CSOs have to identify areas in which they strongly feel that they want and can make contributions
and then prioritise these areas byorganising and allocating their resources (DP7).
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A final factor contributing to vague CSOs identified was the issue of 'fund driven' organisations.
(DP2:DP6-8:CSO1:CSO3). The problem is that in whichever sector organisations feel there is
funding they will try to operate in (CSO1). This cause CSOs to engage in particular areas based
on the funding possibility rather than on the organisation's competence and comparative
advantage in that sector. In regard to this the problem of conditioned funding was raised. Many
CSO stakeholders expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that DP funding often comes with an
agenda since it undermines CSOs development and independence (CSO2:CSO4-6). As
acknowledged:
DPs are part of this problem, we are throwing money at them and saying ‘do this, do that’ and then
expecting miracles in that specific sector (DP9).
Likewise DPs admitted that DPs have ‘created’ many CSOs and that is not sufficient instruments
for financing CSOs in a way that keep donors at distance (DP4). Consequently it was concluded
that a major challenge for CSOs is to become less dependent upon external funding that comes
with an agenda.
Insufficient Capacity 
An overarching theme in most interviews was the perceived low capacity, in terms of financing,
human resources, technical expertise and organisation, of CSOs. Lacking financial capacity was
predominately identified by CSOs as a major hindrance. Especially it was pin pointed that with
increased General Budget Support there is a risk that less funding is given CSOs (CSO1-6):
With direct project funding there was always room for CSOs, but now with basket funding it is
difficult for us to get money(CSO6).
Most DPs and the Government officials however did not perceive there to be insufficient
funding. One DP explained that the direct CSO funding of the cooperation had not decreased as
a consequence of the aid effectiveness agenda (DP6).
Regarding human capacity and resources it was argued by CSOs representatives that the lack of
full time employees is a major capacity issue for CSO effectiveness. Full-time employees are
necessary for qualitative participation and CSO contribution as it allows organisations to have
people specifically focusing on policy-dialogue, negotiation and to follow domestic development
processes (CSO1:CSO3-5). Today most people in CSOs work on a voluntary basis on their spare
time (CSO1). As to the technical expertise it was highlighted by the Government officials and
DPs that most CSOs do not have enough capacity in terms of data gathering and analysis,
presenting cases and in conveying their messages in a coordinated way(DP3a).
Another dimension of lacking capacity brought up during the interviews was the tendency of
current interactions between CSOs, DPs and Government only to take place at national level
with a small and centralised CSO elite in Dar es Salaam. Whereas there are a handful strong
CSOs operating at the national level there are very few organisations at community level (DP8).
Moreover:
Whereas CSOs in Dar es Salaam are strong, they are in a sense far away from ‘reality’. Hence it is
questionable whether theyare good and legitimated representatives of the people (DP3b).
Accordingly, this poor organisational capacity of community based organisations causes it to be a
poor civic representation from local to national level - also impinging centralised CSOs'
possibilityto represent the 'voice' of the people.
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5.3.2 Opportunities  
Even if the hindrances facing CSOs seem daunting a fewopportunities have also been identified.
Overall it has been argued that the relation between CSOs, Government and DPs has
ameliorated. That Government officially invited CSOs to participate in the annual General
Budget Support review and the Poverty Policy Week 2008 suggests that Government not only is
becoming more transparent but also more open-minded towards civil society (ibid). This official
recognition CSOs as valued parties was considered to be the main opportunity (CSO2-5:DP4-
6:DP8-9:GoTa). There to it was argued that the already existing participatory frameworks and
mechanisms have become more civil society 'friendly' (CSO2-5:DP4:DP6-9:GoTa). E.g. CSOs
are regularly involved in some of the sector working groups, both on DP and Government side
(GoTab:CSO5:DP8). Moreover, especially in the education and mining sector, there are
examples, such as HakiElimu, when CSOs have engaged successfully in policy advocacy
(CSO1:CSO4-5:DP6:DP8).
Regarding funding and donor dependency it was highlighted that there already exist mechanisms
for independent funding that could be developed. E.g. Foundation for Civil Society and Rapid
Funding Envelopes30 were mentioned as good basket funding mechanisms helping CSOs to
become less dependent upon DP agendas (DP4). Nevertheless, the capacity of and knowledge
about these funds is limited.
5.3.3 Analysis  
There are many hindrances facing the Tanzanian CSOs in becoming more engaged in aid
effectiveness. The greatest problem seems to be the limited ability of CSOs to operate
independently from the state and DPs. Nevertheless, the fact that Government has opened up
the doors to policy dialogue by inviting CSOs to participate in the new Dialogue Structure is
definitelyone step in the right direction of seeing CSOs as valued partners.
However it is not enough with onlya formal acceptance. There need to be substance and practise
as well to it. Otherwise the sentence will be a cabotinage for pleasing international agendas and
directions. To avoid this the establishment of a conducive and proactive practise - by all parties -
is vital. There must not only be a genuine will to include CSOs but also a willingness to
understand the nature, problems and issues facing them. There are no 'quick-fix' solutions to this.
It must be understood that obtaining mutual respect and appreciation is a learning and
accustoming process. Since the inherent tension between CSOs and Government might obstruct
the process of genuinely accepting CSOs as valuable partners in practice it must be accepted that
time and patience will be required.
Whereas the vague identity of CSOs in terms of lacking vision and focus is perceived to be a
problem it could on the other hand be argued that the unconformity of civil society in Tanzania
rather is an asset. As discussed by Howell and Pearce (2001) the strength and value added of
CSOs lies to some extent in the multiplicity of organisational types and in their varied work.
Hence, it might not be desirable to try to homogenise CSOs into a sector structured DoL
determined by the Government. Furthermore, the tendency of them avoiding certain sectors
could possibly be explained by the funding pattern of DPs. As pinpointed, many CSOs are 'fund
driven' and their practise depends on funds donated by DPs. When looking at the funding
pattern by DPs in Tanzania it can be concluded that in the health and education sector there is a
lot of funding for CSOs compared to e.g. good governance (DP4). Further, if considering, the
history of the relationship between Government and civil society, it is easy to understand that
30 See Appendix 2 for Glossary
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traditional and service delivery oriented sectors like education and health might be easier for
CSOs to engage in as they are not as adversarial like corruption and good governance. With little
experience and capacity of engaging in policy-advocacy in combination with a protective
Government it becomes a true challenge or CSO to operate in these political sensitive areas.
However, herein lies the opportunity of exploring already existing channels to independent
funding of CSOs.
5.4 End Analysis  
So far it can be concluded that the result of the study is not unexpected or remarkable.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that it has not provided valuable insights or that there are no
interesting points to drawupon further. In this section a more focused analysis regarding the new
Dialogue Structure will be done from a CSO perspective and in line with the retrieved result. The
reason for this is to evoke and deepen the national discourse on how CSOs can enrich the aid
effectiveness agenda. Even if focus herein is on the operationalisation of the new Dialogue
Structure it is not to say that there is no need for CSOs to contribute to aid effectiveness outside
this framework. Rather it might be beneficial for CSOs to develop independent mechanisms for
advocacy and monitoring of Government by e.g. making use of media and other channels for
communication and social mobilisation. However, due to the limited space of writing and the on-
going implementation process of the Dialogue Structure, I have chosen not to elaborate further
on that.
New Dialogue Structure 
It stands clear that structured stakeholder dialogue is a central factor not only for aid
effectiveness per se but also as a participatory mechanism for CSO contribution. As pinpointed,
regarding this credence in dialogue, it is remarkable that so few informants referred to the new
Dialogue Structure. The implementation of the Dialogue Structure is supposed to convey a
national consultative framework for on-going policy-dialogues between Government, DPs and
CSOs31 at various levels and in several sectors (GoT 2008). Accordingly the practical appliance of
it should, at least abstractly speaking, give CSOs the possibility to take a more active stand in aid
effectiveness. However, from a CSO perspective there are several issues that need to be
addressed as howto practicallymake it operational and CSO inclusive.
The first issue to consider is which CSOs are to be included in the various
sector/thematic/cluster working groups32 and national dialogue fora33. It goes without saying that
it is impossible to have a complete representation of CSOs due to logistical and efficiency
reasons. Accordingly it must be discussed which CSOs are to participate in which forum. It
should also be discussed upon whose demand and criteria specific organisations are to or not to
get involved. Likewise it should be contemplated who the CSOs are to represent: civil society at
large? Specific marginalised groups? Or their own organisational interest?
The most straightforward organisation of CSOs representation according to the interviewed
Government officials would be to have specialised CSOs or sector networks showing
comparative advantage participating in sector/thematic/cluster working groups whereas umbrella
organisations could take part in the higher national dialogue fora34. In this way a technical and
31 The newDialogue Structure however refers to Non-state Actors rather than to CSOs.
32 See Appendix 8
33 See Appendix 7
34 Higher and/or national dialogue fora refers to the Joint Coordination Group and the MKUKUTA-
PER main. See Appendix 7
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sector specific competence could be guaranteed at lower levels of dialogue whereas a broader and
more united CSO representation could be achieved in the higher level of dialogues. However,
with this approach it must somehow be guaranteed that information generated and decisions
taken at lower levels of dialogue are channelled up through the structure and shared between the
CSO representatives. Otherwise umbrella organisations might not be aware of what has been
discussed throughout the year in the sector/thematic/cluster working groups, which could dilute
their respective representation and contribution in annual consultations and policy dialogues with
Government and DPs. Furthermore, considering the perceived low value added of umbrella
organisations in Tanzania, for them to successfully become the main civil society interlocutors in
national dialogues there is a clear need for them to, not only become more representative of their
constituencies, but also more qualified for the purpose. This is likewise true for sector specific
CSOs. There is also the issue of non-representativeness of CSOs in certain cross-cutting and
more political difficult sectors/themes such as corruption and good governance. How is CSO
representation to be initiated within these areas of dialogue? What if there are no CSOs that are
willing to get engaged?
Secondly, it is not only a question of what kind of organisation that is to participate in which
forum, but also which specific CSOs that are to take their 'seat around the table' and upon whose
request these organisation are nominated, selected and included. As to the request, it was
explained by the interviewed Government officials that it is up to the Government to formally
invite CSOs. This should be done by them sending a general invitation to the major umbrella
organisations. Then it will be up to them to internally agree which organisations are to represent
civil society in which fora. There are two distinct risks with this. Firstly, there is a risk that
Government only invites to 'old goodies' - i.e. organisations that Government perceives to be
cooperative. Umbrella organisations that are perceived awkward or too adversarial might
consequently run the risk of not being incorporated. Secondly, there is a risk that the invitation
stays at the desk of the Director of the umbrella organisation rather than turning into an internal
discussion and evaluation over suitable candidates. Furthermore, even if this should be regraded
as an opening up by Government vis á vis CSOs, the request and initiative of inclusion is not
directly taken or driven by the CSOs themselves. This, in combination with the fact that no
CSOs have been engaged in drafting the newDialogue Structure limits the CSOs' ownership over
their own possibility to participation. They have not been part of determining the set up,
identifying priority sectors/thematic/cluster areas, suggesting how they can contribute or what
kind of functions they would want to fulfil within the structure etc. Accordingly, the framework
of CSO engagement in the structure could be perceived as directed by Government. Crassly
argued CSOs have been provided a finalised structure with the demand of aligning to it but
without anydirections of howto practicallydo so.
In light of this it could be reflected over the possibility that CSOs might not want to become
incorporated in the Dialogue Structure as they might perceive it as non- conducive. Is it then to
be no CSO representation or are CSOs to be forced to participate in the various dialogue fora?
Even if this may be an unlikely scenario in pleno it is not impossible in part. E.g. as already
discussed there are certain sectors which CSOs already now are reluctant and hesitant to engage
in. Since the result from this study indicates, the awareness amongst CSOs regarding the new
Dialogue Structure is low - if they at all know about it. Accordingly, we can not know the
reaction of CSOs as theybecome exposed to the newDialogue Structure.
It can be understood from the set up of the Dialogue Structure35 and from the interviews that the
most straightforward and 'rational' wayfor CSOs to get involved would be to adopt a sector wise
35 See Appendix 7
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approach like DPs. Such an alignment would require quite an internal reorganisation and
development of the Tanzanian civil society. Yet, to judge from the interviews it seems to
predominately be DPs and the Government inquiring a more distinguishable sector division of
CSOs in relation to stakeholder cooperation in aid effectiveness. Such a development takes time
and the implementation of the new Dialogue Structure is approaching. Further, normatively
speaking any kind of evolution of civil society should be internally evoked and progressed
naturally if the result not is to become a civil society with a 'weak identity' (Howell & Pearce
2001). Hence, changes in civil societyshould not be driven byexternal parties (ibid). Accordingly
the request of inclusion and will of sector reorganisation should come from the civil society
actors themselves. If CSOs do not see the benefit of being part of the dialogue or if there is no
genuine will to participate 'forced' or impelled inclusion into the Dialogue Structure might only
lead to unsustainable and non-constructive CSOs contribution.
Conditionality of participation!? 
Taking this into consideration in combination with identified hindrances, is it realistic, if even
desirable, to demand of CSOs to adopt a sector structure in order to become considered as
valued partners in aid effectiveness? Should focus not rather be upon what is feasible and what
the CSOs themselves believe to be appropriate ways forward? Further, as acknowledged in the
Accra Agenda, we need to "Invite CSOs to consider howthe Paris principles can best be applied
to CSOs as well as enriched from a CSO perspective" (Accra Agenda for Action 2008:3).
Accordingly, CSOs should be given the opportunity to influence the nature of the stakeholder
cooperation with in aid effectiveness - which, to deem of the result, they are not enabled to do
today. Besides, if taking into consideration the negative effects of an 'external manufactured' civil
society should it not then be up to the CSOs to, not only define their role(s) within the aid
effectiveness framework, but also to demand their inclusiveness? Likewise, should it be up to
CSOs to find their own ways and mechanisms for contribution? Of course, for them to do so,
they need support. The responsibility of DPs and Government should be to enable CSOs to
participate in the national structures by unbiased means. This demands that all parties must strive
towards achieving a conducive environment in which possibility is given CSOs to contribute in
alternative ways, outside the national systems, if so desired. In the end what must be avoided is
some kind of 'Accra conditionalityof participation' driven byDPs and Governments!
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6 Discussion 
A lot of issues have been raised, problematised and discussed throughout this paper. What
possible remains is to suggest how concerned stakeholders could proceed in enabling CSO
engagement in aid effectiveness processes and how to take the research further. Unfortunately
due to the limited space of writing there is no possibility to do so in the main text. Nevertheless,
in Appendix 9 a summary of the recommendations given both to DPG Secretariat and the
participating informants is provided. This chapter will rather serve as a commentaryon the study
per se with reflections over the investigation, field-methods and result.
Reflections 
It has truly been a privilege conducting this study. Being able to do research about CSOs in aid
effectiveness in this multifaceted manner has enriched, not only me as a researcher, but
presumable also the overall initiative to deepen the engagement of CSOs in the Tanzanian aid
effectiveness processes.
The study aimed at providing initial information regarding relations, tendencies, trends etc. so to
increase the understanding of the topic. Even if the paper is not capturing the complete picture
of the situation or contributing with a solution to genuine CSO engagement in aid effectiveness,
there are a lot that could be learnt from it and built on. Overall, the thesis is perceived to have
contributed with:
• Knowledge transfer and information sharing on stakeholders' perceptions regarding
possible role(s) of CSOs in aid effectiveness.
• Facilitating a common understanding of mechanisms and procedures through which
CSO can engage.
• Acknowledging and assessing the hindrances and opportunities facing CSOs in
Tanzania in becoming valued partners in aid effectiveness.
Also it is anticipated that the documentation of stakeholders' perception and the analysis of it has
contributed with an information benchmark for continued discussions regarding CSOs and aid
effectiveness in Tanzania. E.g. identifying main hindrances and opportunities open up for the
possibility to, in an informed manner, develop strategies and set priorities for strengthening CSO
performance.
Considering this it must be concluded that the thesis has not only fulfilled its purpose, but also
been able to take an important first step in contextualising and applying the goals set up by the
Accra Agenda for Action regarding CSOs. Accordingly, I believe that the methodological
approach taken and the practical methods used have served the objectives of the study well. I
perceive that theoretical saturation was achieved and that elements for theory building and for
further research have been provided .Overall, fewmajor methodological and practical hindrances
have occurred throughout the investigation. What could however be highlighted again is the
overall limited geographical, sector and institutional representation of the stakeholders, which
might have affected the representativeness and generalisabilityof the result.
Nevertheless, it stands clear that there is a lot to be done before the Accra principles on aid
effectiveness and CSOs are put in practice in Tanzania. Further studies enriching the principles
from a CSO perspective is indeed needed and practical reformations of on-going dialogue
practices and structures are necessary. To contribute to and intrigue this process I will suggest a
number of questions that I believe important to investigate, analyse and discuss.
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Questions for further discussion 
A lot of questions have risen throughout the study which unfortunately, due to time and space
restraints, have not been dealt with in this paper. Hence they are left to other researchers to take
on:
• What is the role and contribution of Parliament, UN and Media in aid effectiveness
processes and in supporting CSOs?
• What is the role and contribution of international NGOs in domestic aid
effectiveness and in supporting local CSOs? Are they in a better position to support
capacitybuilding of domestic CSOs in a less conditioned manner?
• How is increased General Budget Support influencing direct and indirect funding of
CSOs?
• Which sources of independent funding is available for CSOs in Tanzania and how
can these sources become improved and more accessible?
End Note  
Reaching genuine CSO participation in Tanzania's aid effectiveness processes is a challenge.
Nevertheless, this is a process that just have started and considering the existing opportunities
and procedures it is just a matter of time and continued open-mindedness of all partied before
CSOs are considered and acting as valuable parties in the many processes of aid effectiveness in
Tanzania.
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7 Conclusion  
With the Accra Agenda for Action there is a call to deepen the engagement of CSOs national in
aid effectiveness and to enable them to reach their full potential as valued partners. This study
has been an attempt to, in the aftermath of the High Level Forum in Accra, contextualise the
issue of CSO engagement and contribution in aid effectiveness. The purpose of this has been to
increase the understanding of conceivable role(s) and mechanisms for CSO involvement as well
as what hindrances and opportunities are facing CSOs in becoming further engaged in aid
effectiveness processes in Tanzania.
The guiding methodology for fulfilling the purpose was the Grounded Theory Approach as
adopted. The methods for data collection have been participatory observations and semi-
structured interviews with representatives from the Government of Tanzania, Development
Partners and CSOs. The informants were selected through purposive and snow-ball sampling. In
total 21 people were interviewed. Regardless of methodological and ethical considerations the
investigation experienced some limitations. E.g. the limited representation of informants might
have influenced the validity of the primary data. Also from a reliability perspective it would have
been preferable to have a broader geographical, sector and institutional representation from all
three stakeholder groups. Nevertheless, in-line with the purpose, the gathered data was deemed
to be reliable to a satisfying degree in order to do initial analysis on the topic
The result of the study indicates that all three stakeholder groups perceive CSOs engagement to
be important, necessary and welcomed in aid effectiveness. A handful functions of CSOs in aid
effectiveness have been. Whereas DPs stressed the importance of advocacy Government
highlighted service delivery as main function of CSOs. CSOs on the other hand did not prioritise
one role over an other but argued that different roles fulfil diverse functions in aid effectiveness.
It was concluded that several mechanisms already exist allowing for CSOs participation.
However, the qualityof them are lowand theyare more on an ad hoc basis rather than part of an
ongoing participatory system. Amongst the identified mechanisms participatory and on-going
policy-dialogues were stressed as utterly important by all stakeholders. However considering this
focus on dialogue it was highlighted and discussed that, apart from the Government officials,
only three of the interviewed DPs and none of the CSOs representatives, mentioned the new
Dialogue Structure. The on-going implementation process of the new Dialogue Structure was
specificallydiscussed from a CSO perspective.
The non-conducive socio-political environment, hindering CSOs to operate independently from
the state and DPs, along with the wanting capacity of the CSOs was identified as main
hindrances. However, the fact that Government has opened up the doors to policy dialogue by
inviting CSOs to participate in the new Dialogue Structure is definitely one step in the right
direction of seeing CSOs as valued partners. Yet. it has been stressed that it is not enough with
only a formal invitation. There need to be substance, practise and a genuine will as well to it.
Otherwise the sentence will onlybe a cabotinage for pleasing international agendas.
In the end it was conclude that it should be up to CSOs themselves to demand their participation
and determine which role they should play, and how. DPs and Government should accordingly
by unbiased and unconditioned means support and enable CSOs. Likewise, all parties should
strive towards achieving a conducive environment allowing CSOs to contribute in alternative
ways, outside the national systems, if so desired. All of this is of primary concern in order to
avoid some kind of 'Accra conditionalityof participation' driven byDPs and governments!
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 - Summary of International Agendas on Aid 
Effectiveness and Harmonisation  
Monterrey Statement (2002) 
In 2002 the Monterrey Statement was endorsed by Heads of State and Government. The
statement as an outcome of the Monterrey Conference and the United Nations International
Conference on Financing for Development. Apart from the jointly agreed financing principles
USA and EU committed themselves to new development objectives. The participants also
reached agreement regarding relief, corruption, and policy coherence. (The United States
President's EmergencyPlan for AIDS Relief)
The MonterreyStatement embraces six areas of Financing for Development:
• Mobilizing domestic financial resources for development.
• Mobilizing international resources for development: foreign direct investment and other
private flows.
• International Trade as an engine for development.
• Increasing international financial and technical cooperation for development.
• External Debt.
• Addressing systemic issues: enhancing the coherence and consistency of the international
monetary, financial and trading systems in support of development (ibid)
Rome Declaration on Harmonisation (2003) 
In early 2003 the bigger multilateral development banks, international organisations, donors,
governments meet in Rome for a High-Level Forum on aid Harmonisation. Bysigning the Rome
Declaration on Harmonisation the participants agreed to take action in order to improve the
management and effectiveness of aid. They further committed to take "stock of concrete
progress" and the meet up in 2005 to evaluate the initiative. (Aid Harmonization and Alignment
2008)
The Rome Declaration on Harmonization sets out to:
• Ensure that harmonization efforts are adapted to the country context, and that donor
assistance is aligned with the development recipient's priorities.
• Expand country-led efforts to streamline donor procedures and practices.
• Review and identify ways to adapt institutions' and countries' policies, procedures, and
practices to facilitate harmonization.
• Implement the good practices principles and standards formulated by the development
communityas the foundation for harmonization (ibid)
Joint Marrakech Memorandum (2004) 
The second roundtable discussion took place 2004 in Marrakech. Over 50 country
representatives and 20 international development organisations signed a joint memorandum
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setting out principles and action plans for how to managing for development result (EBRD
2004). The discussions were centred around how "...countries and development agencies can
work more effectively, individually and collectively, to help countries achieve their development
goals (ibid:1). Five core principles for managing for development results were set by the
Memorandum:
• At all phases from strategic planning through implementation to completion and beyond
focus the dialogue on results for partner countries, development agencies, and other
stakeholders.
• Align actual programming, monitoring, and evaluation activities with the agreed expected
results.
• Keep the results reporting system as simple, cost-effective, and user-friendlyas possible.
• Manage for, not by, results.
• Use results information for management learning and decision-making, as well as for
reporting and accountability(Joint Marrakech Memorandum 2004:2)
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)  
The Paris Declaration was the result of the Paris HLF on aid effectiveness taking place 28
February-2 March in 2005. Envoys and heads of government from 90 donor and recipient
countries as well as 26 representatives of international organisations and multilateral donors
participated in the meeting (OECD 2005). A few civil society and public sector representatives
attended the meeting as observers. The reason behind the Paris Declaration was the recognition
that too much focus had been put on the quantity of aid rather than on the quality of it.
Fragmentation and conditionality of aid caused high transaction costs and unnecessary
administrative pressure on recipient countries. Moreover, the system resulted in low national
ownership of recipient countries and little contextual orientated aid. The objective with the
meeting was to discuss and agree upon how to make aid more effective and harmonized. (Hauer
2006)
The signatories of the agenda committed themselves to:
• Lower transaction costs byincreased donor harmonisation
• Tailor large-scale development aid to specific requirements of recipient countries, and
• Strengthen recipient countries ownership over their national development strategies
(Paris Declaration 2005).
Accra Agenda for Action (2008) 
In September 2008 around 1200 development stakeholders, including Governments, donor
institutions, foundations, parliaments, and civil society organisations, gathered in Accra for the
Third High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness. The intention with the conference was to follow
up on the Paris Principles and to speed up the implementation of them. In the Accra Agenda for
Action recipient countries and donors agreed on steps to take in order to further reform and
make aid more effective. (EU 2008)
Following principles were agreed upon:
• Predictability: Donors will provide 3-5 year forward information in their planned aid to
partner countries
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• Country Systems: Partner country systems will be used to deliver aid as the first option,
rather than donor systems.
• Conditionality: Donors will switch from reliance on prescriptive conditions about how
and when aid money is spent to conditions based on the developing country's own
development objectives.
• Untying: Donors will relax restrictions that prevent developing countries from buying
the goods and services they need from whomever and wherever they can get the best
qualityat the lowest price. (OECD)
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Appendix 2 -Glossary  
Basket Fund: "A basket fund is a funding modality under which more than one Development
Partner collectively funds a country's development programme or sector as a whole with
harmonisation procedures, processes, etc". (JAST 2006:34)
Development Partner: "Development Partners are members of the Development Partners
Group (DPG) and other bilateral and multilateral agencies that provide official development
assistance to Tanzania". (JAST 2006:35
Development Partners Group: "The DPG is the coordinating body of the DPs in Tanzania. It
was formalized in 2004 on basis of Rome Declaration and TAS but was revised in 2006 in
response to Paris Declaration and JAST. The members of DPG are all bilateral and multilateral
donors that provide development assistance to Tanzania. Currently DPG consist of 17 bilateral
DPs36 and 5 multilateral agencies (including the UN system)37. The purpose of DPG is to, under
lead of GoT, "...promote the implementation of the Paris principles on Aid Effectiveness in
Tanzania in order to support national efforts to achieve Tanzania's growth and poverty reduction
goals" (DPG 2007:1). More specifically the objectives of the DPG is to 1) improve the
effectiveness of dialogue and 2) to coordinate DP harmonization and alignment efforts" (DPG
2007:2).
Development Partner Group Secretariat: "UNDP is providing a permanent secretariat to
DPG (the DPG secretariat). The main objective of the Secretariat is to maintain the records of
DPG and provide necessarysupport". (DPG 2007:5)
Foundation for Civil Society: "The Foundation for Civil Society is a Tanzanian non-profit
company, designed and funded by a group of like-minded development partners, and governed
by an independent Board...The Foundation aims to establish an intermediary support mechanism
for civil society organisations in Tanzania which will enable effective engagement in poverty
reduction efforts as set out in the Government of Tanzania policies: Vision 2025, the Tanzania
Assistance Strategy, and the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP).
The Foundation is one of the largest support mechanisms for civil society in Tanzania, and is
committed to delivering grant aid and supporting capacity-building initiatives as a means of
strengthening effective engagement in poverty reduction". (The Foundation of Civil Society
Tanzania 2009:1)
General Budget Support: "GBS is an aid delivery modality which provides financial assistance
to the overall national budget. It is allocated by the Government according to its legal and
budgetary process and hence subjected to the same degree of contestability as domestic
resources". (JAST 2006:35)
GBS annual Review: "The General Budget Support (GBS) Annual Review is the most
significant meeting of the year between the Government of Tanzania (GoT) and the fourteen
Development Partners who provide aid in the form of general budget support (GBS)...The
reviewlooks at the progress that has been made by the GoT in meeting the targets set out in the
National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty...In so doing the review takes a detailed
look at all development issues outlined in the MKUKUTA clusters including, health, transport,
36 Belgium (Embassyand BTC), Canada (CIDA), Denmark, Finland, France, Germany(GTZ,
Embassy and KfW), Ireland (DCI), Italy, Japan (Embassy, JICA;JBIS), Korea, Netherlands, Norway,
Spain, Sweden (SIDA), Switzerland (SDC), UK (DIFD) US (USAID and MCC).
37 EC, AfDB, IMF, World Bank, UN (UNESCO, UNFPA, UNAIDS, UNIDO, UNICEF, ILO,
IFAD, FAO, UNDP, WFP, UNHCR, WHO, UN-Habitat, UNCDF).
 - 48 -
education, agriculture as well as governance and government reform and map out objectives for
subsequent year. The Annual Reviewis an important part of the process by which Development
Partners decide how much money to provide to the GoT in general budget support" (DPG
Secretariat 2009:1)
JAST Working Group: The JAST Working Group is a DP-lead group aimed at supporting the
Government in the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the JAST (JAST 2006)
National Strategy for Growth and reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA): "The MKUKUTA is
Tanzania's second-generation PRS. It is the central coordinating framework for growth and
poverty reduction initiatives in the country. It is set out for five years and adopts an outcome-
based rather than a sector-oriented approach, based on three broad clusters: (1) Growth and
reduction of income poverty; (2) improvement of the quality of life and social well-being; and (3)
governance and accountability". (JAST 2006:36)
Non-state Actors: "Non-state actors are local communities; CSOs including non-governmental
organisations (NGOs), community-based and faith-based organisations; academic and research
institutes; the private sector and the media" (JAST 2006:36)
Paris Declaration 2005: "The Paris Declaration was adopted at the Second High-Level Forum
on Aid Effectiveness in Paris in March 2005. It commits donors and developing countries to take
far-reaching and monitorable actions to reform the ways in which aid is delivered and managed
for greater aid effectiveness. The Partnership Commitments of the Declaration focus on national
ownership, harmonisation, alignment, managing for results, and mutual accountability". (JAST
2006:37)
Poverty Policy Week: "Poverty Policy Week is a three-day forum popularly known as PPW to
discuss the country’s development progress...The overall objective of the forum is to assess and
discuss progress in the implementation of MKUKUTA and the Public Expenditure Review
(PER). In contrast the previous PPW fora, the 2008 consultations had the additional value of
allowing stakeholders to discuss in the wider context the PER. Approximately, a total number of
400 participants managed to participate in the 2008 PPW" (PolicyForum 2008:1).
Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys: "A Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS)tracks
the flow of public funds and material resources from the central government level, through the
administrative hierarchy, and out to the front-line service providers". (U4 2007:1)
Rapid Funding Envelopes: "Rapid Funding Envelope (RFE) for HIV/AIDS is an innovative
partnership among the Tanzanian Commission for AIDS, the Zanzibar AIDS commission, nine
bilateral donors, and one private international foundation. Developed and launched in 2002, the
RFE provides grants (up to $200,000) for short-term projects to civil society organizations
(CSOs) in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar" (Rapid Funding Envelope 2006:1)
United Nations Civil Society Advisory Committee (UNCSAC): "The United Nations
Country Team in Tanzania has set up a Civil Society Advisory Committee to strengthen the
contributions of the United Nations and civil society to the country's development... Its eleven
members represent a broad diversity of issues and constituencies, including faith-based
organizations, trade unions, the private sector, women's organisations, youth organizations,
people living with HIV/AIDS, people living with disabilities, policy networks and NGO
umbrella associations. The committee will provide strategic and substantive input to the
humanitarian and development policies and programmes of the UNCT in Tanzania...The
committee will also guide the work of the UN with civil society and help to develop and
implement joint CS-UN activities and programmes, such as partnerships and programming in the
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context of the UNDAF, capacity development, and initiatives to promote domestic
accountability". (UNDP 2007b:1)
Zanzibar Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUZA): "The MKUZA is the
second generation of the Zanzibar Poverty Reduction Plan (ZPRP), aiming at enhancing
economic growth and reducing poverty. It is a result-based strategy, emphasising cross-sectoral
linkages and focusing on attaining outcomes in three broad clusters, namely (1) growth and
reduction of income poverty, (2) social services and well being, and (3) good governance and
national unity". (JAST 2006:39)
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Appendix 3 - Overview of Meetings and Workshops  
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Appendix 4 - Interview Guide  
Phase one - Presentation 
1. Relate to the informant bya presentation of the interviewer (and the interpreter)
2. Ask if I can use the name
3. Let the informant presents himself/herself.
4. Describe the overall studyand its purpose
5. Explain whythe participation of the informant is important for the study
6. Describe what the expectations are and ask if the informant has any expectations of the
interview
7. Emphasis that the interviewis voluntary
8. Ask if the informant has anyquestions so far
Phase two - Description 
a) Describe the overall structure and themes of the interview
b) Ask for permission to take notes and account for the intended methods for it (e.g.
recording, interpreters, note-taking, etc.).
c) Ask for permission to contact people who might be mentioned in the dialog
Phase three - Introduction 
(1) Ask the informant to generallydescribe his/her work.
(2) Ask what the informant knows about the Paris Declaration and the national aid
effectiveness process.
(3) When appropriate, move in to anyof the boxes.
Box 1 -  Perceived role(s)/function(s) of CSOs in relation to the  national aid 
effectiveness process 
 Identify if, and in such case when in the process, the informants
perceive CSOs to be important for national aid effectiveness

 Identify if the informant perceives that CSOs, as a whole or some
specific parts, should be incorporated in the process
 Identify which role(s) the informant considers CSOs should have/play
in general or in specific areas/sectors

 Identify why the informant perceive CSOs should play this/these
role(s)/function(s)
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Phase four - General evaluation

 Round off and conclude

 Retell the interviewin short terms and ask if the summaryis in line with the perception of
the informant
 Once again, ask for permission to contact person who might have been mentioned during
the dialog

 Thank the informant
Source: Adapted from Hjern and Andersson (1998).
Box 2 -  Perceived ways and mechanisms for CSOs to fulfill the perceived role in 
regard to the national aid effectiveness process (only relevant if the informant 
perceive that CSOs should have a role to play)  
 Identify which ways and mechanisms the informant perceives necessary
and/or preferable in order for CSOs to fulfill the perceived role(s)
Box 3 -  Realization of previous attempts of engaging the CSOs.  
 Identify if the informant knows about or have been taking part of any
previous attempt of incorporating CSOs in the national aid
effectiveness process
 Identifywho participated in that attempt
 Identifywhat the informant thinks the outcomes of that attempt were
Box 4 -  Perceived hindrances and opportunities facing CSOs to   fulfill the 
perceived role/functions 
 Identify what hindrances and opportunities the informant considers
there to be for CSOs to fulfill its perceived role(s)/function(s)
• Identify what solutions the informant perceives there to be to the
hindrances
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Appendix 5 - Informant Information  
Organisation/Ministry/Cooperation Position
DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS
Enrico Strampelli Head of Cooperation
Heikki Haili Head of Cooperation
Jesper Kammarsgaard
Head of Cooperation
Minister Counsellor
Pieter Dorst
Zabdiel Kimambo Governance Advisor 
Yuko Suzuki
Reid Sirrs
Balandya Elikana Poverty Reduction Budget Support Secretariat 
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS 
Maalima Khalfan Executive Director 
Fatma Alloo
Oddvar Bjorknas Executive Director 
Elizabeth Missokia Executive Director 
Francis Kiwanga Executive Director 
Cathy Doran Programme Manager
GOVERNMENT
Name of 
Informant
European Commission                                                                                           
http://www.deltza.ec.europa.eu/
Finish Embassy                                                                                                                      
http://www.finland.or.tz
Danish Embassy                                                                                            
http://www.ambdaressalaam.um.dk/en                                                                                                            
Poverty Reduction Budget Support Working Group                                                       
http://www.tzdpg.or.tz
Head of Cooperation / 
Chair of PRBS working 
group
Axel Doerken
Frank Holtmeier
GtZ (Germany)                                                                                                           
http://www.gtz.de/en/599.htm Priority Area 
Coordinator (Local 
Governance)
Svein Baera
Joan Mungereza 
Norwegian Embassy
http://www.norway.go.tz/info/embassy.htm Programme Officer, 
Gender and Civil 
Society 
Embassy of Netherlands                                                                                            
http://tanzania.nlembassy.org/                                                                                                                               
JAST Working Group
Head of Cooperation 
and chair of the JAST 
WG
DfID                                                                                                                                            
http://www.dfid.gov.uk
UNDP/DPG Secretariat                                                                                                         
http://www.tzdpg.or.tz/
Aid Coordination 
Specialist 
CIDA                                                                                                                                                       
http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/tanzania                                                                                                                     
DPG Main                                                                                                                                  
http://www.tzdpg.or.tz
Head of Cooperation / 
Co-Chair of DPG Main
Chair of PRBS 
Secretariat
Organisation of people with disabilities in Zanzibar: “is a national cross-disability organization 
established in 1985 with a purpose of mobilizing people with various disabilities to bring about lasting 
changes for the benefit of all persons with disabilities” (UWZ 2008:1)                           
http://www.uwz.or.tz/
Tanzania Media Women Association:
“The Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA) is a non-governmental Organisation (NGO) 
formed in 1987 by 12 women journalists and broadcaster who strongly opposed the way media 
portrayed women and determined to join hands to remedy the situation”(TAMWA 2003:1)                    
http://www.tamwa.org/                                                                                                                                                
UN Civil Society Advisory Committee
Media and 
Development 
Consultant for 
TAMWA and Chairlady 
for UNCSAC 
Norwegian Peoples Aid: NPA is an international NGO. “NPA Tanzania works in close cooperation with 
local organisations, primarily centred in the Coast/Central Zone and the Kagera Region. The thematic 
focus of the country programme is Land and Resource Rights, Democratic Rights, Indigenous People’s 
Rights and Youth Rights” (NPA 2003)                                                                                  
http://www.npaid.org/
Hebron Timothy 
Mawakagenda
The Leadership Forum:”The Leadership Forum was established in 2000 and formally registered on 15th 
December 2000 as a trust by the Administrator General under the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional 
affairs (CAP 375).It strives to see individuals; men and women release their leadership potentials in 
creating opportunities for the well being of all humanity in society. Their mission is to realize and 
encourage people in the society with the ability, capacity and commitment to lead others by and 
through influence and responsibility” (The Leadership Forum 2008)                             
http://www.tlftz.org/index.php?                                                                                                                          
Policy Forum: “Policy Forum is a network of NGOs incorporated as a non-profit company under the 
Companies Act of 2002... including over 50 non-governmental organizations registered in 
Tanzania...with specific interest in influencing policy processes to enhance poverty reduction, equity 
and democratization” (Policy Forum).                                                                          
http://www.policyforum-tz.org/ 
Executive Director of 
The Leadership Forum 
and Board member of 
Policy Forum
HakiElimu: “HakiElimu is a non-profit civil society organization. HakiElimu works to realize equity 
and justice in basic education and society by promoting the democratization of governance at all levels 
of society. Our approach focuses on creating space for concerned citizens to make a difference in 
education and democracy. Throughout, we seek to bridge persistent gaps between policy and practice by 
making current policies work for the people, and we also ensure that the Government serves the public 
and provides practical justice to all concerned” (HakiElimu 2009).             
http://www.hakielimu.org/index.php
Legal Human Right Centre: “The LHRC is registered under the Companies Ordinance Chapter 212 of 
the Laws of Tanzania as a Company without shares limited by guarantee. The organization was founded 
from a human rights project of another organisation; the Tanzania Legal Education Trust (TANLET).  
The LHRC has a mandate to operate throughout Tanzania. the LHRC envisages a just and equitable 
society which can be contributed to, through the planned mission as a non-profit making, non-partisan 
non-governmental organization striving to empower the public, promote, reinforce and safeguard human 
rights and good governance in Tanzania” (Legal Human Rights Centre 2007) 
http://www.humanrights.or.tz/
DanChurchAid Tanzania: “Established in 1922, DanChurchAid (DCA) is today one of the major 
Danish humanitarian non governmental organisations (NGO), working with local partner, international 
networks, churches and non-religious civil organisations to assist the poorest of the poor. 
DanChurchAid began its activities in Tanzania in 1963 with support to refugee work. Since then 
DanChurchAid has supported programmes in Tanzania through the Lutheran World Federation and 
Tanganyika Christian Refugee Sevice (TCRS)” (DanChurch Aid Tanzania)                                                       
     http://www.danchurchaid.org
Mukajungu Kamuzora
Neema Mkwizu
Aid Coordination Section External Finance Department (Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs) 
http://www.mof.go.tz/
Economist
Economist
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Appendix 7 – Proposed new Dialogue Structure (Attachment 1) 
Proposed new dialogue structure 
Effective, high qualityand regular dialogue between the Government, Development Partners and
domestic stakeholders is crucial for our successful co-operation towards achieving national
development, growth and poverty reduction goals. Currently, sector and national dialogue takes
place around different processes (PER, MKUKUTA, GBS etc.), with often overlapping agendas,
schedules and memberships without clear selection criteria as well as weak or unclear
interlinkages. This has led to high transaction costs as well as insufficient quality and ineffective
dialogue arrangements and their expected outputs. For example, MDAs engage in sector dialogue
with DPs and at the same time are direct members in PER CWGs, representing their own
Ministries rather than the sector at cluster level. Structures for national dialogue throughout the
year are in place for the PER process, but are missing for the MKUKUTA process in terms of
policy dialogue on MKUKUTA implementation. The only multi-stakeholder forum for this
purpose is the MKUKUTA Annual Review/PovertyPolicyWeek.
Figure 1. Current dialogue structure 
In viewof these shortcomings in the existing dialogue structure, a newstructure is proposed with
the following features:
(4) Dialogue structure integrates to the greatest extent possible all existing processes
(MKUKUTA, PER, JAST and GBS), thus combining dialogue on policy and
budgetary/expenditure issues, in order to reduce overlaps and transaction costs.
(5) Dialogue structure has three levels:
d) Sectors/thematic areas where MDAs (and active DPs) are direct members, whereby a
distinction is made between internal Government dialogue and dialogue between the
Government, DPs and non-state actors
PER Main Working Group
PER CWG 1 PER CWG 2
PER CWG 3
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Macro 
Group
Thematic 
AreaSector
MDA MDA DP
DP
DPs
DP
Non-state actors
PER CWG 4
GBS 
Annual 
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PER Consultative Meeting
GBS TWG 1 GBS TWG 2
GBS CWG 3
GBS CWG 5
GBS TWG 4
GBS TWG 6DP
MDAs
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Non-state actors
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Non-state actors GBS 
DP
GBS 
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MDA
MDA DP
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e) 3 Cluster Working Groups (CWGs) corresponding to the three MKUKUTA clusters: (1)
Growth and Income Poverty Reduction; (2) Improvement of Quality of Life and Social
Well-Being; and (3) Governance and Accountability, where sectors/thematic areas are
represented, as well as a MKUKUTA-PER Macro Group
f) MKUKUTA-PER Main Working Group where CWGs and the MKUKUTA-PER Macro
Group are represented. The change of name from the previous PER Main Working
Group to MKUKUTA-PER Main Working Group reflects the broadening of the
dialogue agenda to include MKUKUTA and related policyissues
(3) Sectors/thematic areas and CWGs have a lead and deputy lead MDA (and lead DP), which
represent other members in dialogue at the next higher level:
a) The sector/thematic area lead and deputy lead MDA – together with
lead DP – represent the sector/thematic area at cluster level, but can
still be accompanied bysector experts if the need arises
b) The CWG lead and deputy lead MDA – together with the cluster lead
DP – represent the CWG in the MKUKUTA-PER Main Working
Group, but may be accompanied by technical experts from
sectors/clusters if the need arises.
(4) Annual Review consultative meetings will take place at sector/thematic area
and national (MKUKUTA-PER) levels.
Figure 2. Proposed new dialogue structure 
Source: Government of Tanzania (2008 Attachment 1)
MKUKUTA-PER Main Working Group
MKUKUTA-
PER CWG 1
MKUKUTA-
PER CWG 2
MKUKUTA-
PER CWG 3
MKUKUTA-
PER Macro 
Group
Sector A Sector B Thematic 
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MDA MDA
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Sector/thematic 
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Sector/thematic 
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Sector/thematic 
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Appendix 8 - Sector and Cluster Working Groups and Thematic 
Area Working Groups  
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Appendix 9 - Summary of Recommendations to DPG Main, 
Government and CSOs 
There will be a true challenge for all stakeholders in obtaining genuine CSO engagement in
Tanzania's aid effectiveness processes. Not only will it be about finding new ways of
collaborations, working-methods and dialogue structures - it will also be about establishing new
roles and change attitudes. As argued, this is a process in which CSOs must be given the space
and time to transform in their own way and develop without being pushed or stressed by various
interests or agendas. Otherwise sustainable and constructive CSO contribution might not be
achieved. Even though it must be accepted that this transformation must come naturallythere are
things that could be done in order to enable and facilitate for CSOs as well as accommodate
them with opportunities to become better involved in aid effectiveness.
If CSOs are to become seen and treated as valued partners in aid effectiveness it is of outermost
importance that the expectations of them are put in relation to the socio-political dynamics of the
environment they are operating in rather than in relation to normative and generic expectations
stated in international frameworks and in academic theories. This is important in order to avoid
abstract misconceptions and to create an understanding of the national situation. Hence further
studies are definitely required. Considering the outdated information on the Tanzanian civil
society domestic research institutes, such as the REPOA, should engage in research. Further
there is a direct opportunity to make use of this study. Even though this paper is not capturing
the whole situation or contributing with a formula for genuine CSO engagement there are a lot
that could be learnt from it. It is hence recommended that the study and its outcomes are
criticallyassessed and discussed both within and between stakeholder groups. Overall, it is utterly
important that the results form any study is communicate to and discussed amongst concerned
stakeholders. In accordance to this study participating stakeholders are inclined to ask following
questions:
• What is the result indicating?
• What could be learnt from it?
• Is it giving any 'new' information or confirming previous perceptions?
• Which questions have been raised that needs to be taken further?
• Are anyof the issues raised in need of further clarifications?
• Is anything missing in the research?
Whereas the internal stakeholder dialogue over these question might be easier to practically
initiate, cross-stakeholder discussions might be a logistic challenge. Nevertheless, as indicated in
the main text, there are already structures in place which could be made use of. E.g. it is possible
to:
• Arrange for a result and analysis presentation and discussion of the study during a DPG
main meeting.
• UNCSAC could arrange for a separate workshop in which CSOs and other interested
stakeholders could critically discuss the outcome. Or UNCSAC could make use of one of
the monthlybreakfast meetings at Unicef to bring up the studyfor discussion.
• The DPG Secretariat could arrange for a voluntary workshop/presentation in which
representatives from the three stakeholder groups are invited.
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Regardless of howit is done and through which fora, the most important thing is to continue the
discussion about how CSOs can become deeper engaged and regarded as valued partners in aid
effectiveness.
Secondly, considering the suggested importance of on-going stakeholder dialogues for CSO
participation in aid effectiveness, the operationalisation of the new Dialogue Structure should be
placed high on the agenda. Yet, as discussed the implementation of the structure might not be as
straightforward. From a CSO perspective the process however starts by actually being informed
about the structure and the possibilities of CSOs to be integrated into it. Taking into account that
non of the CSO representatives in this study mentioned the new Dialogue Structure in the
interviews it could be questioned whether CSOs understand it or if they at all are aware of its
existence. Without adequate information and guidance to understand it it will become extremely
difficult for any CSO to make a claim for participation or for that make any constructive
contribution. Accordingly it is highly recommended that the structure is first and foremost
'communicated' to CSOs. This is of primary importance especially since CSOs have not been
integrated in the planning and drafting of the structure.
There are many ways by which the newDialogue Structure can be communicated and instructed.
The most straightforward way is to make sure that at least all umbrella organisation, major
networks and the UNCSAC have received a copy of it - preferable in Kiswahili. Additionally,
there are CSO fora which could be made use of in order to convey these messages. E.g. the
monthly Unicef breakfast meetings and the yearly civil society forum are opportunities during
which the Government can inform about the new Dialogue Structure and allow CSOs to pose
questions. Furthermore separate workshops initiated either byGovernment or DPG where CSOs
could be informed about the structure but also be enabled to comment on it would be a good
way to start integrating CSOs in the implementation process. This last point is of great
importance. If CSOs are to be regarded as value added partners they must start to practically be
treated that way. The newDialogue Structure is currently being implemented and the Division of
Labour of DPs between sectors and thematic areas is being established. nevertheless, so far no
CSOs are engaged in these procedures. From a CSO and Accra perspective it is recommended
that, even if it might be perceived that CSOs are lacking the capacity, CSOs become integrated in
the current implementation initiatives and discussion.
However, as identified in the end-analysis of the main text there are several question remaining
regarding CSO inclusion in the new Dialogue Structure. Even so, it seems quite straightforward
to initiate discussions with CSOs regarding these issues. Even if the structure as such has been
determined by the Government there might is still be room for discussion and consensus
building around the actual character and objectives of the various sector and thematic area
dialogues. As CSOs are to be present in these dialogues they should be integrated in establishing
the nature of the stakeholder dialogue.
Thirdly, it should not be forgotten that there already are cases where there are good
collaborations and dialogues within sector/thematic working groups between CSOs and DPs or
CSOs and Government. These cases should accordingly be acknowledge and studied. Several
question could be posed in regard to this in order to increase the understanding of how CSOs
can become further incorporated in the newDialogue Structure:
• In which sectors and thematic areas are there already active CSOs and where are there no
participating CSOs? What are the reasons behind it?
• On whose initiative have the CSOs become engaged in the working groups?
• What kind of CSOs are participating?
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• What kind of contribution do they do and what kind of dialogue is taking place in the
working group?
• Howis the contribution perceived bythe parties?
Answering these questions requires both a mapping over the CSO engagement in the various
working groups as well as a structured qualitative study. This would not onlyopen up for a better
understanding of what is going on, but also contribute with a framework for experience exchange
between the various working groups. It has been indicated by one of the participants that an
initiative of such a mapping has been previously taken by the PRBS secretariat. Hence, it should
be followed up how far that mapping has come and what the scope of it is and if it needs to be
extended.
Fourthly, as could be understood from the main text the issue of independent funding is regarded
as a major hindrance for CSOs to become independent, strong and valued partners in aid
effectiveness. Accordingly, there is a challenge for CSOs to become less dependent upon
conditioned, directs as well as indirect, funding. In consideration of this it is advisable to look
into the possibilities of extended core funding. Like General Budget Support to Governments,
CSOs should be supplied a similar funding mechanism. This could of course be achieved by
developing the already existing mechanisms for independent funding. E.g. it should be
questioned, investigated and analysed if and how Rapid Funding Envelopes and the Foundation
of Civil Society could become stronger and more useful for CSOs. This has however not only to
do with the actual amount of money made available. It also regards the actual awareness of these
mechanisms and the understanding of howCSOs can apply for these funds. Therefore initiatives
to inform CSOs about these funding mechanisms should be undertaken as well as studies aimed
at providing recommendations on how to develop overall core funding is Tanzania should be a
priorityof e.g. REPOA and DPs.
Further, it was perceived by most CSO representatives that the actual amount of money donated
to CSOs is decreasing due to an increased General Budget Support direct to Governments.
However, as indicated by one DP the direct funding to CSOs had not decreased. Accordingly
there i a need for studies on how increased General Budget Support actually influence the
funding of CSOs and their abilityto find non-conditioned funding.
Lastly the opportunity of developing and strengthening CSO lead PETS should be investigated.
As concluded in the analysis PETS could be a very practical tool for CSOs not only to evaluate
aid effectiveness initiatives but also to contribute with information about the situation of ordinary
people at community level. As indicated in some interviews there are already CSOs developing
and conducting PETS and DPs providing training in PETS. However, as the overall awareness
over the result of these PETS and training there is a need to find ways and methods for
communicating the outcomes of these initiatives. There might be already conducted PETS at
local or regional level of which the central Government, DPs and Capital based CSOs know
about. Accordingly, not only are studies concerning the PETS methodology as such needed but
also inventories of what already exists in form PETS methodologies, conducted and on-going
surveys, trainings etc.
